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Our lives are changing at an 
unprecedented pace. Transformational 
shifts in our economic, environmental, 
geopolitical, societal and technological 
systems offer unparalleled 
opportunities, but the interconnections 
among them also imply enhanced 
systemic risks. Stakeholders from 
across business, government and civil 
society face an evolving imperative in 
understanding and managing 
emerging global risks which, by 
definition, respect no national 
boundaries. 
Conceptual models are needed to 
define, characterize and measure the 
potential negative impacts of 
interconnected global risks. It is in this 
spirit that I present the Global Risks 
2014 report, now in its ninth edition. 
This report aims to enhance our 
understanding of how a 
comprehensive set of global risks is 
evolving, how their interaction can lead 
to unexpected and often systemic 
impacts, and the trade-offs involved in 
managing them.
Global Risks 2014 is a stimulus for 
reflection for policy-makers, chief 
executive officers, senior executives 
and thought leaders around the world. 
It is also a call to action to improve 
international efforts at coordination and 
collaboration, going beyond the 
traditional roles and responsibilities of 
the public and private sectors to equip 
institutions to understand, map, 
monitor, manage and mitigate global 
risks. 
The report emphasizes the importance 
of understanding systemic risks, 
long-term thinking to address and 
Preface mitigate them and the critical role of the younger generation. To do so, it offers 
deep-dive analytical insights into 
interconnected risks with the potential 
to have systemic consequences in the 
geopolitical, socio-economic and 
digital spheres. The report features an 
analysis of a survey of over 700 leaders 
and decision-makers from the World 
Economic Forum’s global 
multistakeholder community on 31 
selected global risks. For the first time, 
survey respondents were asked 
directly to nominate their risks of 
highest concern, which placed 
economic and social issues firmly at 
the top.
I would like to thank the partners of the 
Global Risks 2014 report, without 
whose expert contributions this report 
would not have been possible: Marsh & 
McLennan Companies, Swiss Re and 
Zurich Insurance Group, as well as the 
National University of Singapore, 
Oxford Martin School at the University 
of Oxford and the Wharton Risk 
Management and Decision Processes 
Center at the University of 
Pennsylvania. My appreciation also 
goes to the World Economic Forum’s 
Network of Global Agenda Councils for 
their important insights, under the 
leadership of Martina Gmür. I am also 
grateful to Jennifer Blanke, Chief 
Economist, and the Global Risks 2014 
project team members Beñat Bilbao-
Osorio, Ciara Browne, Gemma 
Corrigan, Roberto Crotti, Attilio Di 
Battista, Gaëlle Dreyer, Margareta 
Drzeniek Hanouz, Caroline Galvan, 
Thierry Geiger and Tania Gutknecht for 
their critical contributions to making this 
report possible. 
Moving from urgency-driven risk 
management to more collaborative 
efforts to strengthen risk resilience 
would benefit global society. Together, 
leaders from business, government 
and civil society have the foresight and 
collaborative spirit to shape our 
global future.
Klaus Schwab 
Founder and Executive Chairman 
World Economic Forum
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Executive Summary
The Global Risks 2014 report highlights how global risks are 
not only interconnected but also have systemic impacts. To 
manage global risks effectively and build resilience to their 
impacts, better efforts are needed to understand, measure 
and foresee the evolution of interdependencies between 
risks, supplementing traditional risk-management tools with 
new concepts designed for uncertain environments. If global 
risks are not effectively addressed, their social, economic 
and political fallouts could be far-reaching, as exemplified by 
the continuing impacts of the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
The systemic nature of our most significant risks calls for 
procedures and institutions that are globally coordinated yet 
locally flexible. As international systems of finance, supply 
chains, health, energy, the Internet and the environment 
become more complex and interdependent, their level of 
resilience determines whether they become bulwarks of 
global stability or amplifiers of cascading shocks. 
Strengthening resilience requires overcoming collective 
action challenges through international cooperation among 
business, government and civil society.
Mapping Global Risks in 2014
Based on a survey of the World Economic Forum’s 
multistakeholder communities, the report maps 31 global 
risks according to level of concern, likelihood and impact and 
interconnections among them.  
– The risks of highest concern to respondents are fiscal 
crises in key economies, structurally high unemployment 
and underemployment, and water crises (Table 1).  
Table 1: Ten Global Risks of Highest Concern in 2014
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
Note: From a list of 31 risks, survey respondents were asked to identify the five they 
are most concerned about.
– The risks considered high impact and high likelihood 
are mostly environmental and economic in nature: greater 
incidence of extreme weather events, failure of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, water crises, severe 
income disparity, structurally high unemployment and 
underemployment and fiscal crises in key economies. 
Female respondents perceived almost all global risks as 
both more likely and more impactful than did males, 
especially in the environmental category. Younger 
individuals gave higher scores for the impact of almost all 
of the risks, particularly environmental risks, such as 
water crises, greater incidence of natural catastrophes, 
the loss of biodiversity and greater incidence of extreme 
weather events.
– The risks perceived to be most interconnected with 
other risks are macroeconomic – fiscal crises, and 
structural unemployment and underemployment – with 
strong links between this macroeconomic risk nexus and 
social issues, such as rising income inequality and 
political and social instability. The failure of global 
governance emerges as a central risk that is connected 
to many different issues. Mapping perceived 
interconnections between risks helps to understand the 
potential transmission channels between them. 
– The decline of trust in institutions, lack of leadership, 
persisting gender inequalities and data mismanagement 
were among trends to watch, according to survey 
respondents. Experts added further concerns including 
various forms of pollution, and accidents or abuse 
involving new technologies, such as synthetic biology, 
automated vehicles and 3-D printing.
No. Global Risk
1 Fiscal crises in key economies
2 Structurally high unemployment/underemployment
3 Water crises
4 Severe income disparity
5 Failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation  
6 Greater incidence of extreme weather events  (e.g. floods, storms, fires)
7 Global governance failure
8 Food crises
9 Failure of a major financial mechanism/institution
10 Profound political and social instability
Box 1: Objectives of the Global Risks 2014 Report
The world faces risks that can be addressed only by 
long-term thinking and collaboration among business, 
governments and civil society. The Global Risks 2014 
report aims to support this process by:
– exploring the nature of systemic risks
– mapping 31 global risks according to the level of 
concern they arouse, their likelihood and potential 
impact, as well as the strength of the 
interconnections between them 
– looking in-depth at the ways in which three 
constellations of global risk – centred on youth, 
cyberspace and geopolitics – could interplay and 
have systemic impact
Global Risks 201410
Three Risks in Focus 
Of the many conceivable ways in which possible 
interconnections and interdependencies between global 
risks could play out systemically over the 10-year horizon 
considered by this report, three are explored in depth: 
– Instabilities in an increasingly multipolar world: 
Changing demographics, growing middle classes and 
fiscal constraints will place increasing domestic demands 
on governments, deepening requirements for internal 
reform and shaping international relations. Set against the 
rise of regional powers, an era of greater economic 
pragmatism and national self-protection might increase 
inter-state friction and aggravate a global governance 
vacuum. This may hinder progress on cross-cutting, 
long-term challenges, and lead to increased inefficiencies 
and friction costs in strategically important sectors, such 
as healthcare, financial services and energy. Managing 
this risk will require flexibility, fresh thinking and 
multistakeholder communication.
 
– Generation lost? The generation coming of age in the 
2010s faces high unemployment and precarious job 
situations, hampering their efforts to build a future and 
raising the risk of social unrest. In advanced economies, 
the large number of graduates from expensive and 
outmoded educational systems – graduating with high 
debts and mismatched skills – points to a need to adapt 
and integrate professional and academic education. In 
developing countries, an estimated two-thirds of the 
youth are not fulfilling their economic potential. The 
generation of digital natives is full of ambition to improve 
the world but feels disconnected from traditional politics; 
their ambition needs to be harnessed if systemic risks are 
to be addressed. 
 
– Digital disintegration: So far, cyberspace has proved 
resilient to attacks, but the underlying dynamic of the 
online world has always been that it is easier to attack 
than defend. The world may be only one disruptive 
technology away from attackers gaining a runaway 
advantage, meaning the Internet would cease to be a 
trusted medium for communication or commerce. Fresh 
thinking at all levels on how to preserve, protect and 
govern the common good of a trusted cyberspace must 
be developed. 
Collaborative multistakeholder action is needed. Wide 
variance in how risks are identified and managed still exists. 
Businesses, governments and civil society alike can improve 
how they approach risk by taking steps such as opening 
lines of communication with each other to build trust, 
systematically learning from others’ experiences, and finding 
ways to incentivize long-term thinking. By offering a 
framework for decision-makers to look at risks in a holistic 
manner, the Global Risks 2014 report aims to provide a 
platform for dialogue and to stimulate action.
Introduction
Accelerating change in the 21st century has bound 
countries, economies and businesses ever more tightly 
together through better infrastructure, faster and more 
efficient communication systems, and closer trade and 
investment links. Innovations such as the Internet and 
mobile phone have boosted productivity, created new 
business opportunities and enhanced access to information. 
Economic growth has lifted millions of people out of poverty.
Yet the same dynamic that lies behind these gains – 
everything being more connected and interdependent 
– also threatens to undermine them. Economic growth, 
for example, may be inexorably undermining its own 
foundations through its negative side-effects on ecosystems, 
biodiversity and the climate – effects that cannot be stopped 
at national borders. Disruptions in the online environment are 
becoming as impactful as those in the physical world, if 
not more.
Since 2006, the Global Risks report has been calling 
attention to global risks that can be systemic in nature, 
causing breakdowns of entire systems and not only their 
component parts. 
These risks can come from many sources. The greater the 
interdependencies between countries and industries, the 
greater the potential for events to bring about unforeseen, 
cascading consequences. The year 2013 alone witnessed 
a number of illustrations of such risks, bringing significant 
losses in terms of both human life and wealth. The fiscal 
crisis in the United States (US), the subsiding threat of 
sovereign default in eurozone countries and popular protests 
in emerging markets all presented economic risks far 
beyond national borders. Typhoon Haiyan took a heavy toll 
on the Philippines, even as global leaders debated climate 
change in Warsaw in November 2013. Syria’s refugee crisis 
destabilized the entire Middle East. Revelations about data 
leakage and new forms of espionage created geopolitical 
tensions that may yet have far-reaching implications in the 
years to come. These events have painfully emphasized that 
the world is not equipped to deal with global risks.
This year, as in past editions, the Global Risks report 
represents a step in a continuous process of improving 
how global risks and their interconnections can be put 
on decision-makers’ radar screens, to provide a basis for 
dialogue on how governments, business and civil society 
can work together effectively to build resilience and mitigate 
any negative effects accruing from them. 
Part 1 of the report presents the results of this year’s 
Global Risks Perceptions Survey, enumerating the 10 
risks that respondents nominated as being of highest 
concern and also those they thought were most likely and 
potentially impactful. It also maps the strength of perceived 
interconnections among these risks to provide a holistic 
picture of the complexity and broad framework needed to 
understand their full potential impact. Finally, it includes a 
“risks and trends to watch” section, noting additional issues 
that respondents and experts were concerned about. 
Part 2 selects and explores in detail three constellations 
of global risks from the Risks Interconnections Map. 
“Instabilities in an Increasingly Multipolar World” examines 
possible interconnections among risks related to the 
changing geopolitical order. “Generation Lost?” looks at how 
high rates of youth unemployment risk stoking social unrest 
and squandering human and economic potential, and how 
the current situation will affect tomorrow’s youth. “Digital 
Disintegration” imagines how cyberspace could become 
severely affected through growing strength of attacks and 
dwindling trust, at a huge cost to economies and societies.
The report also features contributions from several of the 
Forum’s Global Agenda Councils, which bring together 
thought leaders from academia, business, government, 
international organizations and other civil society 
organizations to set the global agendas in their respective 
fields. The Councils’ contributions explore a selection 
of specific risks that rank highly on the Global Risks 
Perceptions Survey. 
The multistakeholder collaboration required to address 
global risks should take place through effective mechanisms 
of global governance, as global risks can only be addressed 
at a global level. Addressing risks effectively takes not only 
a common understanding of the issues and a willingness 
to work together but also the building of mutual trust and 
nurturing of the capacity for long-term thinking – issues 
further explored in the concluding section of Part 2. 
Part 3 analyses the main learnings from past Global Risks 
reports and looks ahead towards the 10th anniversary of the 
report in 2015. 
To work together to prepare and mitigate risks and 
strengthen resilience, leaders in business, politics and civil 
society all need to first identify, understand and monitor the 
most important global risks. The Global Risks 2014 report 
aims to facilitate this process and provide a platform 
for dialogue.
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Part 1: Global Risks 2014: 
Understanding Systemic 
Risks in a Changing Global 
Environment 
Box 1.1: What Is Systemic Risk? 
Systemic risk is the risk of “breakdowns in an entire 
system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts 
and components”.1 Systemic risks are characterized by: 
 
– modest tipping points combining indirectly to 
produce large failures
– risk-sharing or contagion, as one loss triggers a chain 
of others
– “hysteresis”, or systems being unable to recover 
equilibrium after a shock
Note 
1 Kaufman, G. G. and K. E. Scott. 2003. “What Is Systemic Risk, and Do 
Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?” Independent Review 7 (3): 
371–391.  See quote on p. 371.
 
Source
Goldin, I. and M. Mariathasan. The Butterfly Defect: How globalization 
creates systemic risk, and what to do about it. Princeton University Press. 
Forthcoming Spring 2014.
A global risk is defined as an occurrence that causes 
significant negative impact for several countries and 
industries over a time frame of up to 10 years. A key 
characteristic of global risks is their potential systemic nature 
– they have the potential to affect an entire system, as 
opposed to individual parts and components – as defined in 
Box 1.1 below.
This report considers a core set of 31 global risks in five 
categories (see Table 1.1): economic, environmental, 
geopolitical, technological, and societal (Appendix A 
provides the definitions of individual risks). 
Economic Risks
Risks in the economic category include fiscal and liquidity 
crises, failure of a major financial mechanism or institution, 
oil-price shocks, chronic unemployment and failure of 
physical infrastructure on which economic activity depends.  
Environmental Risks
Risks in the environmental category include both natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes and geomagnetic storms, 
and man-made risks such as collapsing ecosystems, 
freshwater shortages, nuclear accidents and failure to 
mitigate or adapt to climate change.  
Geopolitical Risks
The geopolitical category covers the areas of politics, 
diplomacy, conflict, crime and global governance. These 
risks range from terrorism, disputes over resources and war 
to governance being undermined by corruption, organized 
crime and illicit trade. 
Societal Risks
The societal category captures risks related to social stability 
– such as severe income disparities, food crises and 
dysfunctional cities – and public health, such as pandemics, 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria and the rising burden of chronic 
disease. 
Technological Risks
The technological category covers major risks related to the 
growing centrality of information and communication 
technologies to individuals, businesses and governments. 
These include cyber attacks, infrastructure disruptions and 
data loss. 
The core set of global risks considered in this report is not 
exhaustive, and the Forum attempts to continually refine it as 
the global risks landscape evolves. The list also includes 
“vulnerabilities”, or those trends that are already manifest 
and that affect other risks – for example, an ageing 
population represents a vulnerability potentially affecting a 
country’s fiscal situation. This distinction is further explored 
in Part 3 of this report. 
Since 2009, the Global Risks report has evaluated risks over 
a 10-year time horizon through the Global Risks Perception 
Survey, which gathers the perceptions of the World 
Economic Forum’s multistakeholder communities across 
different areas of expertise, geographies and age groups. It 
includes representatives of the World Economic Forum’s 
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Member and Partner companies,1 members of the Network 
of Global Agenda Councils,2 Global Shapers3 and Young 
Global Leaders.4 Conducted in October and November 
2013, this year’s survey gathered input from over 700 
members of this community. Appendix B lays out a detailed 
description of the survey sample and methodology. 
Three types of results describing global risks accrue from 
the survey:
– the Ten Global Risks of Highest Concern in 2014, 
which highlights the most pressing issues in the opinion 
of survey respondents
– the Global Risks Landscape 2014, which maps risks 
according to survey respondents’ perception of their 
likelihood and potential impact
– the Global Risk 2014 Interconnections Map, which 
shows the interdependencies between all risks, providing 
an understanding of the systemic consequences of 
global risks.
 
Ten Global Risks of Highest Concern  
in 2014 
Economic, societal and environmental risks dominate the list 
of global risks that the respondents are most concerned 
about, with fiscal crises emerging as the top issue (Table 
1.2). Despite the efforts of many eurozone countries to 
control their deficit and debt levels, concerns regarding fiscal 
crises persist. They are also fuelled by the high levels of 
public debt in Japan and the US, where political gridlock has 
exacerbated perceptions. Fiscal crises can severely affect 
the stability of the global economy, as explored further in  
Box 1.2. 
Table 1.1: Global Risks 2014
Fiscal crises in key economies
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution
Liquidity crises
Structurally high unemployment/underemployment
Oil-price shock to the global economy
Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure 
Decline of importance of the US dollar as a major 
currency 
Greater incidence of extreme weather events  
(e.g. floods, storms, fires)
Greater incidence of natural catastrophes  
(e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
geomagnetic storms)
Greater incidence of man-made environmental 
catastrophes  
(e.g. oil spills, nuclear accidents)
Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse  
(land and ocean)
Water crises
Failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
Global governance failure
Political collapse of a nation of geopolitical importance
Increasing corruption
Major escalation in organized crime and illicit trade
Large-scale terrorist attacks
Deployment of weapons of mass destruction
Violent inter-state conflict with regional consequences
Escalation of economic and resource nationalization
Food crises 
Pandemic outbreak
Unmanageable burden of chronic disease
Severe income disparity
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
Mismanaged urbanization  
(e.g. planning failures, inadequate infrastructure and 
supply chains)
Profound political and social instability
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and  
networks 
Escalation in large-scale cyber attacks
Massive incident of data fraud/theft
Table 1.2: Ten Global Risks of Highest Concern in 2014
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
Note: From a list of 31 risks, survey respondents were asked to identify the five they 
are most concerned about.
No. Global Risk
1 Fiscal crises in key economies
2 Structurally high unemployment/underemployment
3 Water crises
4 Severe income disparity
5 Failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation  
6 Greater incidence of extreme weather events  (e.g. floods, storms, fires)
7 Global governance failure
8 Food crises
9 Failure of a major financial mechanism/institution
10 Profound political and social instability
Five years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, with its 
system-wide impacts, the failure of a major financial 
mechanism or institution also features among the risks that 
the respondents are most concerned about, as uncertainty 
about the quality of many banks’ assets remains.5 
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Structural unemployment and underemployment appears 
second overall, as many people in both advanced and 
emerging economies struggle to find jobs. The youth and 
minorities are especially vulnerable. Youth unemployment 
rates hover around 50% in some countries (such as Greece, 
Spain, South Africa). 
Closely associated in terms of societal risk, income disparity 
is also among the most worrying of issues. It raises concerns 
about the Great Recession and the squeezing effect it had 
on the middle classes in developed economies, while 
globalization has brought about a polarization of incomes in 
emerging and developing economies. This is true despite 
the obvious progress in countries such as Brazil and lower 
levels of poverty in several developing countries in Asia and 
Africa. 
Environmental risks also feature prominently in this year’s list, 
appearing as three of the top 10 global risks of greatest 
concern. Water crises, for instance, rank as the third highest 
concern (see Box 1.3). This illustrates a continued and 
growing awareness of the global water crisis as a result of 
Box 1.2: Fiscal Crises: Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Go Back…
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Fiscal Sustainability
The risk of fiscal crises features as the top risk in this year’s Global Risks report. Governments often run deficits, spending 
more than they raise in taxes. They make up the shortfall by selling bonds – borrowing money from private investors with 
the promise of repaying it, with interest, at a specified future date. A fiscal crisis occurs when investors begin to doubt the 
government’s future ability to repay; the government then has to offer higher interest on its bonds to compensate investors 
for the increased risk. A vicious cycle starts: ballooning interest payments add to government debt, increasing the doubts 
of investors and forcing interest rates up still further. This can rapidly turn into a fatal spiral, in which fears that a country will 
default on its debt become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
As government bonds tend to be held in substantial part by domestic banks, when the government defaults, the resulting 
losses on these bonds endanger banks’ solvency. In this way, a fiscal crisis can lead to financial crisis. The causation can 
also run the other way: the government may be forced to bail out large banks at risk of default to avoid a systemic financial 
crisis. However, the additional debt taken on can plunge the government from an already-precarious fiscal position into a 
full-blown fiscal crisis. 
Unsustainable debt developments ultimately force governments to undertake painful fiscal adjustments by cutting 
expenditures and/or raising taxes. If such austerity is not timed well, it can trigger a deep recession and a strong increase 
in unemployment, a dynamic which has played out in many advanced economies since the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
By contrast, most emerging markets were able to quickly recover from the recent financial crisis. Latin American and Asian 
countries, which had experienced their own fiscal crises in the 1980s and 1990s, had implemented reforms to bring 
government debt under control. When they were hit by the fallout of the financial crisis, they had the fiscal leeway to 
stimulate economic activity through the opposite of austerity – increasing spending and/or cutting taxes. 
Advanced economies remain in danger of fiscal crises. Given the US’s official public debt of more than 100% of its GDP, 
and Japan’s of more than 230%, investors may at some point conclude that these levels are unsustainable. In the short 
run, the risks are higher for eurozone countries, which lack the option of devaluing their currencies to ease the necessary 
fiscal adjustment. Although ostensibly in a better position, many emerging markets have seen credit bubbles in recent 
years that could turn into financial crises, and then fiscal crises, for example, the rapid credit growth in Asia since 2008.1 A 
fiscal crisis in any major economy could easily have cascading global impacts.
Finding ways to deal effectively with the current risks of fiscal crises is, therefore, important. Making fiscal frameworks more 
resilient in the future is even more important given the substantial longer-run fiscal challenges created by an ageing 
population.
Note
1 Bowman, A. 2013. “HSBC: Asia’s ‘worrying’ debt-led growth.” Financial Times, February 21. Available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/02/21/
hsbc-asias-worrying-debt-driven-growth/#axzz2mhjDelCh
mismanagement and increased competition for already 
scarce water resources from economic activity and 
population growth. Coupled with extreme weather events 
such as floods and droughts, which appears sixth on the list, 
the potential impacts are real and happening today.6 
Climate change, ranked fifth on the list (see Box 1.4), is the 
key driver of such uncertain and changing weather patterns, 
causing an increased frequency of extreme weather events 
such as floods and droughts. It is important to consider the 
combined implications of these environmental risks on key 
development and security issues, such as food security, and 
political and social instability, ranked eighth and 10th 
respectively.7 
Given that global risks can be addressed effectively only 
through international collaboration, it is hardly a surprise that 
global governance failure is also included in the list as the 
risk of seventh highest concern. 
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The Global Risks Landscape 2014
Figure 1.1 plots the aggregated survey responses on the 
perceived likelihood and impact of the 31 risks. The risks are 
grouped in four quadrants as delineated by the averages of 
their overall likelihood and impact. As evident, most risks 
cluster around the two upper quadrants, which identify risks 
with high impact.
The upper right quadrant shows those global risks that are 
perceived by the respondents as both potentially impactful 
and likely to occur. Similar to the risks of highest concern, 
this quadrant is dominated by economic, social and 
environmental risks. Fiscal crises and structural 
unemployment and underemployment are among the most 
impactful risks; the latter also feature among those most 
likely to occur, with knock-on effects on income disparities, 
which is regarded as the overall most likely risk.
Climate change features among the five most likely and most 
impactful risks. Among other environmental risks, extreme 
weather events are considered the second most likely, and 
water crises also appear high on the list. This suggests a 
pressing need for better public information about the 
potential consequences of environmental threats, given that 
collective action will need to be based on common 
understanding.
The upper left quadrant shows those risks that are 
considered less likely to happen, but would be impactful if 
they did. The deployment of weapons of mass destruction is 
perceived to be high-impact yet the least likely of the 31 
risks, despite recent developments such as North Korea’s 
alleged third nuclear test and the deployment of chemical 
weapons in Syria. Other lower-likelihood, high-impact risks 
are the political collapse of a nation of geopolitical 
importance, an oil-price shock and the inability to deal with 
pandemics.
Box 1.3: Risks that Flow from Water
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Water Security 
Water crises and extreme weather events have been identified by the World Economic Forum community as two of the 
top 10 global risks. This is hardly surprising, given the devastating impacts of having too little water, or too much. While 
water’s immediate impacts are often local, water security is now recognized as a systemic global risk.
In 2010, floods in Pakistan paralysed large parts of the country for many weeks, killing thousands of people and 
wrecking the rural economy. Thailand’s slow-onset flood in 2011 caused fewer deaths but showed how one local event 
could have an impact across the world: global car production slowed as supplies of components were cut, and hard-
drive manufacture for the world’s computers was slashed. Similarly, Japan’s GDP and global industrial production 
dipped significantly following the tsunami of March 2011. 
Too little water can also have systemic impacts. Drought in Russia in 2010 led to restrictions on agricultural exports, 
causing the price of staple grains to rise across North Africa and the Middle East. The resulting food shortages and price 
rises aggravated the tensions that led to the Arab Spring. Some studies suggest that water scarcity could reduce grain 
production by as much as 30%.
In the future, geopolitical tensions over access to strategic water resources could become more systemically impactful, 
and water shortage coupled with poverty and societal instability could weaken intra-state cohesion. Because of the 
systemic importance of water for global economic activity, any failings in its planning, management and use in one 
country can ripple across the world. That management is becoming increasingly complex and difficult as populations 
expand and people grow wealthier, demanding more freshwater to supply cities and factories and consuming more 
foods, such as dairy and meat, that need more water to produce. Water is equally key for energy production. While the 
world population grew fourfold in the 20th century, freshwater withdrawals grew nine times.  
While there is growing concern about future climate change exacerbating water-related risk, many countries cannot 
even manage today’s climate variability. Drought and flood could increasingly ravage the economies of poorer countries, 
locking them more deeply into cycles of poverty. 
Beyond water quantity, water quality is another critical issue. Pollution incidents have paralysed business operations in 
parts of China and elsewhere, disrupting global value chains and damaging corporate reputations – poor water quality 
or shortages are often blamed on business operations even when businesses comply fully with regulatory requirements. 
How can the global community respond? The overarching prescription is for a package of investments in information, 
institutions and infrastructure. But successful water management needs the cooperation of a wide network of water 
users, public and private institutions. 
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Figure 1.1: The Global Risks Landscape 2014 
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
Note: Survey respondents were asked to assess the likelihood and impact of the individual risks on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 representing a risk that is not likely to happen or have 
impact, and 7 a risk very likely to occur and with massive and devastating impacts. See Appendix B for more details. To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are 
abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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Table 1.3: The Evolving Global Risks Landscape (2007-2014) 
Source: Global Risks reports 2007-2014, World Economic Forum.
Note: Global risks may not be strictly comparable across years, as definitions and the set of global risks have been revised with new issues having emerged on the 10-year 
horizon. For example, cyber attacks, income disparity and unemployment entered the set of global risks in 2012. Some global risks were reclassified: water supply crises 
and income disparity were reclassified as environmental and societal risks, respectively, in 2014. 
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Complementing Figure 1.1, the five risks considered most 
likely and most impactful since 2007 are shown in Table 1.3. 
Although the set of risks and their definitions have been 
continually revised over the years, the comparison still 
provides some qualitative insight into how global risk 
perceptions have evolved. 
Environmental risks, such as climate change, extreme 
weather events and water scarcity, have become more 
prominent since 2011, while health-related risks (pandemics 
and chronic disease) have become less so. Concern about 
geopolitical risks, such as global governance failure, has 
given way to concern about socio-economic risks such as 
income disparity, unemployment and fiscal crises. In addition 
to the socio-economic and environmental risks, cyber 
attacks and the breakdown of critical information 
infrastructure are prominent risks. This arguably reflects the 
increasing digitization of economies and societies, where 
rising dependence on information and data, as well as the 
systems to analyse and use them, has made attacks more 
likely and their effects more impactful. 
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Figure 1.2: The Global Risks Landscape 2014 – Gender 
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
Note: To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description
Responses to the survey can be disaggregated by gender, 
as shown in Figure 1.2. An extensive body of literature 
exists on the link between gender and risk perceptions, 
suggesting women are typically more sensitive to risk than 
men.8 Studies also show that women are more likely to be 
concerned about environmental issues.9 Some argue that 
this reflects a tendency for women to think more of the long 
term than men, and to have a more network-focused rather 
than linear approach to problem-solving.10 
It is also possible to isolate the perspective of young 
respondents, those aged under 30 years. In general, the 
younger generation is more concerned about the potential 
impact of global risks, while perceptions of likelihood show 
no such consistent deviation. 
In particular, younger individuals gave higher scores for the 
impact of almost all of the risks with the exception of 
liquidity crises (Figure 1.3). The young consider an oil-price 
shock, the loss of biodiversity and collapse of the 
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Figure 1.3: The Global Risks Landscape 2014 - Age
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
Note: To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description.
Older respondents (30 or over)
Younger respondents (under 30)
ecosystem, and the occurrence of natural catastrophes as 
considerably more likely and impactful than those over 30 
years of age. Furthermore, while both age groups agree on 
the likelihood of environmental risks, younger respondents 
consider risks such as water crises, man-made natural 
catastrophes, the loss of biodiversity and extreme weather 
events more impactful if they were to occur. As with gender 
differences, similar findings emerge from broader literature 
about links between age and concern for the environment.11 
Younger respondents were also more concerned than their 
older counterparts about the impact of the failure of a major 
financial institution, unemployment and political and social 
instability, which fits with the mindset of the “Generation 
Lost”, explored in Part 2.3.
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Box 1.4: Poor Countries Are Losing Ground in the Race to Adapt to a Changing Climate
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Climate Change
The year 2014 is likely to be crucial for addressing climate risks, a point made by United Nations (UN) climate chief 
Christiana Figueres at the Warsaw Climate Change Conference. Countries made only limited progress on issues such 
as emissions reduction, loss and damage compensation, and adaptation. Greater progress is urgently needed to create 
incentives and mechanisms to finance action against climate change while efforts are made to keep temperature rise 
below 2 degrees Celsius. 
Even as governments and corporations are called upon to speed up greenhouse gas reduction, it is clear that the race is 
on not only to mitigate climate change but also to adapt. Droughts, super-storms and other natural disasters are 
increasingly causing systemic risks around the world.  
Failure to adapt most strongly affects the most vulnerable, especially those in the least developed countries. They tend 
to lack the infrastructure and capacity to deal with extreme droughts and floods, reduced crop yields and increased 
stresses on energy and water supplies.
According to the latest Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index, it will take more than 100 years for the world’s poorest 
countries to reach the current adaptive capacity of higher-income OECD countries. The World Bank estimates the cost 
of climate change adaptation for developing countries at US$ 70-100 billion per year through to 2050. 
Gradually, however, promising models are emerging of collaboration between the public and private sectors and civil 
society to strengthen resilience to climate change. An example is the US$ 3 billion Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor 
of Tanzania (SAGCOT), intended to create the infrastructure to nurture new value chains. Through techniques such as 
rainwater harvesting, efficient irrigation and crops that can produce more nutrients for the same input of water, SAGCOT 
aims to increase food production in a way that is both environmentally sustainable and benefits small-scale farmers and 
the rural poor. 
Such innovative and ambitious projects, unlocking investment funds through public-private partnership, showcase the 
kind of multistakeholder collaboration that will be needed across all sectors to meet the twin priorities of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.
Sources
Scherr, S. J., J. C. Milder, L. E. Buck, A. K. Hart, and S. A. Shames. 2013. A vision for Agriculture Green Growth in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor 
of Tanzania (SAGCOT): Overview. Dar es Salaam: SAGCOT Centre. Available at http://www.ecoagriculture.org/documents/files/doc_483.pdf 
World Bank. 2010. Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Synthesis Report, Washington DC: World Bank. Available at http://climatechange.worldbank.
org/sites/default/files/documents/EACCSynthesisReport.pdf
The Global Risks 2014 Interconnections 
Map 
While the 31 risks have been separated out for analytical 
purposes, the numerous and complex interconnections 
between them can create consequences that are 
disproportionate and difficult to contain or predict. The 
Global Risks Interconnections Map (Figure 1.4) seeks to 
connect the dots by identifying and visualizing the underlying 
patterns. This allows for a better understanding of the impact 
of systemic risks so as to mitigate them by identifying the 
transmission channels between risks and potential second- 
and third-order effects. 
These interconnections do not represent direct causality. 
They are likely to be indirect, for example through parallel 
impacts or mitigation trade-offs. 
The Global Risks Interconnections Map shows how all global 
risks are connected to others and underlines the complexity 
of dealing with global risk in an effective manner. The map 
visualizes the strength of connection between individual risks 
– the most strongly connected risks could merit additional 
attention due to the multiple ways they affect or are affected 
by other risks. 
Respondents viewed global governance failure as one of the 
risks most connected to others. A well-functioning system 
could contribute to preventing and mitigating the 
consequences of global risks, which by definition require 
internationally-coordinated responses. The need for an agile 
and responsive multilateral governance system that can 
identify, forecast and respond to the multiple and 
interconnected risks of today’s globalized world is explored 
in Part 2.2 of this report, with particular reference to 
economic and geopolitical risks. 
Macroeconomic risks were strongly linked by respondents to 
various socio-economic issues. Failure of a financial 
mechanism or institution, fiscal crises and liquidity crises are 
risks closely interrelated among themselves and also with 
the risks of high levels of unemployment and 
underemployment, income disparity and political and 
social instability. 
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Recent examples illustrate the reality of these 
interconnections – the failure of financial institutions brought 
about a financial crisis that resulted in liquidity crises 
affecting multiple national economies. This in turn led to 
higher levels of unemployment, widened income disparity 
and associated political and social tensions and protests, 
notably in some European countries and large emerging 
markets. Part 2.3 of this report examines these 
interconnections through the lens of the challenges facing 
today’s youth. 
Environmental risks such as water crises, extreme weather 
events, natural catastrophes, man-made environmental 
catastrophes and climate change present another important 
cluster in the interconnections map. While all these risks are 
interlinked, climate change is of pivotal importance. The risk 
of climate change by far displays the strongest linkages and 
can be seen to be both a key economic risk in itself and a 
multiplier of other risks, such as extreme weather events and 
water and food crises. The latest work by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – its 5th 
Assessment released in late 2013 – states that warming of 
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Figure 1.4: The Global Risks 2014 Interconnections Map 
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014
Note: Survey respondents were asked to identify between three and six pairs of global risks they believe to be most interconnected. See Appendix B for more details. To 
ensure legibility, the names of the global risks are abbreviated. Please see Appendix A for the full name and description.
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the climate system is unequivocal and that each of the last 
three decades has been successively warmer at the earth’s 
surface than any preceding decade since 1850. This is the 
strongest IPCC statement on climate change yet. The 
increased frequency of extreme weather events, such as 
storm surges and droughts, is consistent with the latest 
IPCC modelling.12 The damage to economic assets, such as 
city and industrial infrastructure, agriculture and key global 
supply chains, caused by such extreme weather events is 
becoming more evident, as is the fragility of the global 
logistics and mobility systems (see Box 1.5). Consequently, 
“resilience” has become a key policy and agency theme to 
counteract the growing sense of economic, political and 
social risk that changing climatic conditions pose.
The risk of global governance failure, which lies at the heart 
of the risk map, is linked to the risk of climate change. 
Negotiations on climate change mitigation and adaptation 
are progressing by fits and starts, perpetually challenged to 
deliver a global legal framework. Meanwhile, a regime of 
national, regional and public-private collaborative efforts to 
address the problem is gathering pace. This may represent 
the future of global governance – a more intricate lattice of 
multiple, interconnected government agreements related to 
relatively simple global “goals” (such as a commitment to 
limit warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius), supported 
by a framework of collaborative alliances and partnerships to 
help deliver on that target across different themes, regions or 
sectors. Arguably, such a heterogeneous and diverse 
intergovernmental and public-private response to the 
climate-change risk could offer more resilience and flexibility 
to the dynamic challenge of climate change than a 
homogenous, single global framework.
The technological risks of cyber attacks, data fraud/theft and 
critical information infrastructure breakdown are strongly 
connected to each other and to risks such as terrorist 
attacks and global governance failure. This reflects the 
changing nature of vulnerability in an increasingly digitized 
world, and the need for global multistakeholder collaboration 
to maintain the resilience of cyberspace. These issues are 
explored in Part 2.4 of this report. 
Box 1.5: Growing Cities, Growing Risks
More than half of the world’s population now lives in cities. By 2050, the urban population will have nearly doubled to an 
estimated 6.4 billion. Most of the increase in urban populations will be in middle- and lower-income countries, which 
have more limited capacity to manage the new risks being created – and existing risks being exacerbated – by the global 
urban transition. 
While urbanization provides important economic and social gains, it substantially increases risks related to ecological 
disruptions, pollution, climate change and environmental disasters. Populations are agglomerating along coastal areas 
where climate change portends rising sea levels, extreme weather events, earthquakes and tsunamis. Urban flooding 
has already become the leading form of disaster in the world, and the UN forecasts that the number of people in large 
cities exposed to cyclonic winds, earthquakes and flooding will more than double in the first half of this century.
Around 1 billion people, one-third of the world’s urban population, live in slums1 – a number that has been increasing in 
the current era of high and widening income inequalities. This growing population of urban poor is vulnerable to rising 
food prices and economic crises, posing significant risks of chronic social instability.
Communicable diseases can spread more quickly in densely-populated areas, increasing the risk of global pandemics. 
For example, if a new strain of avian flu were to spread globally through the air travel network that connects the world’s 
major cities, 3 billion people could potentially be exposed to the virus within a short span of time. 
More generally, cities are connected systemically through physical and informational networks in ways that may become 
apparent only when events in one location are rapidly transmitted globally in unexpected trajectories. For example, the 
2011 earthquake in Japan and subsequent nuclear power plant meltdown had cascading impacts through global supply 
chains that immediately led to decreases in auto production around the world.  
As urban populations grow, multistakeholder processes of inclusive governance will increasingly be needed to make 
cities resilient against these complex and interconnected risks. While cities have been efficient at driving change in some 
areas, substantial improvements in urban governance capacities will be needed to address risks, especially in the 
emerging economies where future urbanization will mostly take place, and which are especially vulnerable to  
systemic risks.
Note
1 See http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=10&cid=928.
Source
For more information, see Douglass, M. 2013. The Urban Transition of Environmental Disaster Governance in Asia. Working Paper Series No. 210. Singapore: 
Asia Research Institute. Available at http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=2334.
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Risks and Trends to Watch
Adopting a proactive, precautionary approach to anticipating 
future challenges can help to avoid being caught by surprise 
and forced into a fully reactive mode. A range of assessment 
methodologies can be applied to identifying and 
understanding emerging risks.
In this year’s report, respondents to the survey were asked 
to identify additional global risks that are already or could 
become relevant and were not explicitly surveyed. Figure 1.5 
shows categories of issues that respondents mentioned 
most frequently. Gathered into three broad categories, the 
most commonly identified issues are presented here, 
followed by additional assessments and comments from 
experts.
Demographic trends have been flagged, including the risk 
of being unable to deal with rapid population growth and the 
growing burden of an ageing population – which could also 
be a source of great opportunities for society and business if 
managed effectively. Concerns were also raised about 
unmanaged migration flows, overpopulation and energy 
crises.
Societal concerns include the breakdown of social 
structures, the decline of trust in institutions, the lack of 
leadership and persisting gender inequalities. Risks related 
to ideological polarization, extremism – in particular those of 
a religious or political nature – and intra-state conflicts such 
as civil wars, were also frequently highlighted. Several 
concerns in this category relate to the future of the youth: the 
quality of and access to education, the marginalization of 
young generations and high rates of youth unemployment 
(see Part 2.3 for more on this topic). 
Technological concerns include data mismanagement, 
loss of privacy, increase in surveillance, and possible abuse 
of new and more complex information technology, which is 
further explored in Part 2.4. These risks are becoming 
potentially more impactful as social media transitioned from 
a purely social pastime into the corporate communications 
environment.
 
In addition, risk experts in the insurance industry have 
nominated further trends worth highlighting, which could 
evolve into significant risks: 
Environmental: Two kinds of pollution are especially worth 
noting. First, plastic waste pollution could degrade marine 
ecosystems and spoil shorelines, posing a credible threat to 
ecosystems and human health.13 Second, endocrine 
disruptors in the environment have been linked to human 
health problems through interference with hormonal 
systems.14
Another environmental trend to track is the development and 
production of unconventional oil and natural gas resources, 
such as oil sands and shales, which require processes and 
technologies (e.g. fracking) that differ considerably from 
those used for conventional resources in terms of energy 
input, cost and environmental impact.15 Their impact and 
sustainability are being increasingly questioned.
Science and technology: Several emerging risks are 
associated with the use of new technology, such as the 
potential toxicity of nanomaterials, the future evolution and 
impact of 3-D printing, and uncertainty about the potential 
impact of widespread use of autonomous vehicles, which 
are capable of sensing their environment and navigating on 
their own. The potential for abuse, or an accident involving 
synthetic biology, could even pose an existential risk, as 
discussed in Box 1.7.16
Economic: As a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, 
central banks in many countries have been pursuing an 
ultra-loose monetary policy. Although theoretical fears of 
high inflation and unintended asset bubbles have so far 
mainly been contained, central banks are expected to 
tighten monetary policy.17 The resulting higher interest rates 
could see volatility in asset prices, capital flows and 
exchange rates, and rising government debt due to higher 
interest costs.18 
The rise of the bitcoin and the possibility of other new modes 
of payment could create new risks as well as opportunities. 
Risks relate to the facilitation of money laundering, 
corruption, illicit financial flows as well as volatility and 
susceptibility to security threats and market manipulation. 
China is among the governments that have already begun to 
restrict the use of virtual currencies.19
Social and political: The “costs of living longer” was raised 
as an X-factor risk to watch in the 2013 edition of this report, 
and risks related to longevity remain significant as medical 
advances increase life expectancy, posing funding 
challenges in retirement financing, long-term care and 
healthcare.20 Along the same lines, the prevalence of 
overweight and obesity is increasing and could result in 
significant economic cost.21
Figure 1.5: Risks and Trends to Watch 
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Box 1.6: Sustainable Competitiveness and Global Risks
Appreciation is growing that high historical rates of economic progress, especially those experienced by emerging 
markets, may not be sustainable in the future.
Environmental pressures that could undermine competitiveness include pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change, 
while scarcity of mineral resources could endanger future consumption as demand continues to climb. The implications 
of water shortages, for example, are explored in Box 1.3. Social tensions could also undermine competitiveness, as 
people fear that economic growth may not translate into the desired results for society in terms of inclusion, equity and 
cohesion. 
Although it is clear that these systemic risks can undermine economic competitiveness, the magnitude of their capacity 
to do so and their complex interactions are not well understood. 
Building on its Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), the World Economic Forum is working on a sustainability-adjusted 
GCI that captures the extent to which prosperity is being generated in a sustainable way, taking into account 
environmental stewardship and social sustainability.1 The findings suggest that there is no necessary trade-off between 
being economically competitive and being sustainable. Many countries at the top of the competitiveness ranking are 
also the best performers in terms of sustainability measures – for instance, Switzerland, Finland, Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands. 
The sustainability-adjusted GCI can be seen as capturing a country’s preparedness to face many of the systemic global 
risks explored in this report. Among the core factors it measures are environmental degradation, strength of governance, 
provision of health and education, and macroeconomic stability – all factors that influence how sustainable a country’s 
economic competitiveness is, and how resilient it is to risk. Understanding the relationship between sustainability and 
competitiveness is crucial to understanding how to mitigate and build resilience to global risks. 
Note
1 For more information on the sustainability-adjusted Global Competitiveness Index, see Chapter 1.2 of The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, World 
Economic Forum 2013.  
Box 1.7: An Emerging Spectrum of Catastrophic Risks: Existential Threats 
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Catastrophic Risks
Throughout history, humanity has been all too familiar with catastrophes affecting life and livelihoods on a major scale: 
earthquakes, floods, droughts, tsunamis, cyclones and so on. Increasingly, however, the new risks coming into focus are 
more complex, more uncertain and potentially exponentially more consequential. These are existential risks – those that 
could either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.1
Natural disasters could conceivably trigger existential risks in combination with new technologies – a possibility 
suggested by the March 2011 tsunami that caused a meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. There is 
also the theoretical potential for “error or terror” in emerging sciences, such as nanotechnology or synthetic biology; 
within a few decades, for example, it may become as feasible to create real viruses in a home laboratory as it now is to 
create computer viruses on a home computer. 
Among other existential risks is the possibility that breakthroughs in artificial intelligence could move rapidly in 
unexpected directions; the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria could dramatically set back modern medicine; solar 
super-storms could devastate vital information and communications technology networks; climate change could tip into 
a self-reinforcing, runaway phase of rising temperatures; a meteorite could hit a densely-populated area or an asteroid 
could strike the earth. 
Although these threats sound forbidding, there are ways to prevent most of them, or at least to mitigate their impacts. 
While research and innovation can provide new approaches, established institutions can also play an important role. For 
example, in October 2013 the UN General Assembly approved the creation of an International Asteroid Warning Group.
It is important for the public and private sectors to work together to address existential risks. The private sector has 
experience and expertise to offer in the realms of strategic planning, organizational design, institutional adaptation, 
research, scientific investigation and technological innovation. However, effective public-private collaboration will require 
vision, strategy and commitment to more extensive, consistent and systematic approaches at the country, regional and 
international levels. This, in turn, requires an appreciation that existential risks exist not only in the realms of science 
fiction but also in reality.
Note
1 Existential risks as defined by Nick Bostrom of Oxford University.
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Conclusion
Economic, societal and environmental concerns continue to 
dominate the global risks landscape in the minds of leaders 
around the globe, with the threat of fiscal crises in key 
economies topping the list. The results emphasize the 
interconnectedness of all the global risks analysed in this 
chapter, underscoring the need for effective global 
governance and a better understanding of causes and 
consequences to be able to prepare for, mitigate and 
strengthen resilience to these risks.  
Global risks can only be effectively dealt with if there is a 
common understanding of their importance and 
interconnected nature, and a readiness to engage in 
multistakeholder dialogue and action. The effectiveness of 
such an approach was demonstrated when a protectionist 
response to the 2008 crisis was contained through a joint 
effort by multilateral institutions, the private sector and the 
G20. This report offers a framework for decision-makers to 
look at risks in a holistic manner and to stimulate discussions 
on ways to address global risks more effectively.  
Endnotes
1 See http://www.weforum.org/communities.
2 See http://www.weforum.org/community/global-agenda-councils.
3 See http://www.weforum.org/community/global-shapers.
4 See http://www.weforum.org/community/forum-young-global-leaders.
5 An independent evaluation to be carried out by the European Central Bank in 
major European banks should provide a more detailed assessment of the 
situation. 
6 According to the US Department of Agriculture, the US experienced its most 
severe and extensive drought in 25 years in 2012, with some 80% of all US 
agricultural land experiencing drought. This in turn caused around US$ 40 
billion in lost crops and livestock, according to the National Climatic Data 
Center, and spikes in commodity prices such as corn, which peaked at US$ 
7.63 a bushel – more than one dollar over its high of 2011.
7 For example, while there is no doubt a number of reasons caused the 
devastating civil war, recent research is unearthing the hidden role that climate 
change, extreme weather events and a water crisis also played in Syria. 
Between 2006 and 2011, up to 60% of Syria’s land experienced one of the 
worst long-term droughts in modern history (Werrell et al. 2013). Together with 
the mismanagement of water resources, this drought led to total crop failure for 
75% of farmers, forcing their migration and increasing tensions in urban cities 
that were already experiencing economic insecurity and instability.
8 Eckel and Grossman 2008.
9 See, for example, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980.
10 See, for example, Hong and Page 2001 and Coates and Herbert 2007.
11 See, for example, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980.
12 The risk multiplier that climate change presents to water shortages, 
biodiversity loss, ocean damage and deforestation also creates a complex 
“heterarchy”, rather than a simple hierarchy, of environmental risks, often with 
non-linear patterns of change and self-fuelling feedback mechanisms. This 
heterarchy is not contained within IPCC models, but could encompass the 
greatest economic risk of all from climate change.
13 UNEP 2011.
14 For a recent in-depth risk assessment on endocrine disruptors, see CRO 
Forum 2012.
15 See IEA 2013 and http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/opinion/global/
the-facts-on-fracking.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.
16 See, for example, European Commission 2005.
17 IMF 2013.
18 McKinsey Global Institute 2013.
19 See, for example, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/18/
bitcoin-risks-rewards-senate-hearing-virtual-currency; and http://www.forbes.
com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/29/bitcoins-in-danger-from-the-bureaucracy/.
20 See, for example, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/structural_reforms/
ageing/index_en.htm.
21 Lehnert et al. 2013.
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Part 2: Risks in Focus
2.1 Introduction: Understanding 
Global Systemic Risk
If societies are to thrive in the face of the global risks explored 
in the last section, each element of the global system − 
finance, supply chains, health, energy, the Internet, the 
environment and others − must become more resilient as 
most of the global risks are systemic in nature. This part of 
the Global Risks report contains three explorations of how 
systemic risks could interplay in the coming decade, 
focusing respectively on instabilities in a multipolar world, the 
challenges facing the current generation of youth, and the 
possibility of a breakdown in trust in the Internet. 
In general, the biggest challenge in making systems resilient 
to systemic risk is managing their growing complexities and 
interdependencies, by proactively addressing collective 
action failures and resolving problems through international 
cooperation.
To do this, efforts to understand, measure and foresee the 
evolution of these complex systems must first be improved. 
Next, procedures and institutions that are globally 
coordinated yet locally flexible and responsive must be 
developed. To meet rising complexity effectively, regulation 
must not become more complex but, perhaps paradoxically, 
more simple. Simple and flexible rules are required as rising 
complexity cannot be matched by ever more complex and 
burdensome regulations.
Risk in the hyperconnected environment can no longer be 
treated as something that is confined to particular sectors or 
domains. Physical transport, trade and travel networks, 
This section of the Global Risks report on systemic risk draws heavily on Ian 
Goldin and Mike Mariathasan, The Butterfly Defect: How globalization creates 
systemic risk, and what to do about it, Princeton University Press, Forthcoming 
Spring 2014. Readers are referred to this book for an extensive discussion of all 
the issues that are summarized in this section and for further analysis of 
systemic risk.
energy and water supply networks, and global information 
technology infrastructure can become either a strong 
support for global stability or an amplifier of cascading 
shocks. 
Multiple trends are contributing to linking global systems ever 
more closely and in more complex ways. For example, the 
increased carbon emissions and reduced ecological 
diversity resulting from unsustainable economic growth now 
fundamentally threaten to undermine not only the stability of 
the global ecosystem but also the economies that depend 
on it.
Perhaps the oldest form of systemic risk is that arising from 
viruses and pandemics, a threat that has entered a 
dangerous new phase as people and goods move at 
increasing speeds and over greater distances, with many 
passing through a small number of airports and other hubs. 
Increasing antibiotic resistance is a major concern, while 
new technologies that promise to revolutionize healthcare 
also pose risks of contagious diseases being constructed 
synthetically in laboratories. The potential of food-based 
pandemics or the spread of toxic elements in an increasingly 
globally integrated food chain also raises major concerns.
Society can also generate its own systemic risks, notably 
from growing economic inequality and weakening social 
cohesion within countries, which threaten political stability. 
Globalization has left some countries behind and has been 
associated with rising inequality between and within 
countries. This is augmented by restrictions on migration 
and a failure of policies at the national and global levels to 
promote a more inclusive system. Together, these factors 
render poor people and poor countries vulnerable to 
systemic risks.
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Institutions are failing to tackle these problems. The growing 
complexity of today’s interconnected world reduces the 
ability to make well-informed decisions, leading to a loss of 
responsibility. Politicians often do not gather the support 
required to focus on longer-term strategic concerns. As 
social cohesion weakens and citizens seek to wrest control 
from distant and apparently unaccountable institutions, there 
is more visible support for extremist parties, as well as 
nationalistic, protectionist and xenophobic behaviour.
When “foreign” becomes synonymous with “threat”, the 
case for collective action is made more difficult. Yet it is only 
through collective action that resilience can be built and the 
gravest systemic threats mitigated. Social cohesion could, 
therefore, underpin more effective management of systemic 
threats – as could a greater understanding of causal 
connections between actions and events, allowing for the 
construction of decision-making scenarios in which the 
consequences of actions may be anticipated.1 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was the new century’s most 
widely experienced systemic crisis, and others are likely to 
follow. The same dynamic of individually rational decisions 
leading to greater systemic vulnerability is at work elsewhere. 
For example, in global supply chains, individual firms 
increase efficiency through just-in-time and other 
streamlined management practices, but the removal of 
spare capacity can reduce resilience as each firm believes 
that system stability and sustainability are not their 
responsibility.
Systemic risks are a modern manifestation of the tragedy of 
the commons. They typically transcend national boundaries 
and involve shared resources as well as causality that are 
indirect and time-delayed.2 They are resistant to direct 
technical solutions, requiring instead changes to 
stakeholders’ behaviour. Hence, all stakeholders must 
display greater responsibility – including global businesses, 
governments, international organizations and civil society 
– while efforts are made to fundamentally reform global 
governance. The current system, created in response to the 
Second World War, requires radical changes, including a 
renewal of mandates, shareholding and skills to reflect 
21st-century realities.
Yet, as the interconnections between transport, 
communication, financial and other world systems become 
increasingly complex, the traditional concepts of risk have 
become inappropriate as a basis of modern global 
governance. Systemic risks include elements that cannot be 
easily quantified using traditional tools and formulas from 
probability theory and mathematics, or made to fit the 
classical distinction between risk and uncertainty. As it 
becomes increasingly difficult to identify direct causality, 
traditional risk management needs to be supplemented with 
new concepts designed for uncertain environments.
The next three sections explore in more detail how individual 
risks could combine to create systemic global risks. These 
sections are followed by an analysis of concrete actions that 
leading companies and nations are taking to deal with such 
risks, both individually and through public-private 
partnerships. 
Cyber attacks
Fiscal crises
Political and 
social instability
State collapse
Corruption
Interstate conflict
Income 
disparity
Global 
governance
failure
2.2 Instabilities in an Increasingly 
Multipolar World
Domestic pressures are denting both the appetite and the 
ability of advanced economies to maintain their authority on 
the global stage. Large emerging-market countries are keen 
to play a significant role but are struggling to reconcile rapid 
economic growth, dramatic social change and complex 
political reform. At the same time, global multilateral 
institutions are finding it hard to achieve consensus, and thus 
concerted action, on critical matters due to the proliferation 
of assertive, discordant voices. Figure 1.4 in Part 1 shows 
how the failure of global governance is connected with other 
risks. 
Already, states are prioritizing short-term or proximate 
concerns over long-term or more global issues.3 Not only 
may a resulting global leadership vacuum fuel geopolitical 
instability in the years to come, it may also exacerbate global 
governance challenges and have undesirable consequences 
for the long-term development of systemically important 
sectors such as energy, financial services and healthcare.
Demographic and economic changes, such as growing 
middle classes in most emerging-market countries, ageing 
populations in Europe, China and Japan, and fast-expanding 
populations across much of North Africa, the Middle East 
and India, are transforming societal expectations and 
shaping national political priorities. In parallel, ever more 
extensive trading relationships, international travel, migration 
and technological advances are increasing the speed at 
which ideas, information, people, capital, goods and 
services cross borders.
Against this backdrop, key geopolitical variables will 
influence global development over the next decade. These 
include the ability of key emerging markets to successfully 
deliver on substantial economic and political reforms, and 
the willingness of leading powers to cooperate economically 
and on global governance issues. Thus, across the world, 
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tension between the domestic imperatives of growth and 
stability is setting the mood for international relations.
The Risk Landscape of the Future
With a five-to-ten year lens, four potential threats can be 
identified in light of current trends: emerging-market 
uncertainties, commercial and political frictions between 
countries, the proliferation of low-level conflict, and slow 
progress on global challenges. 
Emerging Market Uncertainties
The four BRIC nations now rank among the 10 largest 
economies worldwide and China is predicted to top the table 
on a purchasing power parity basis within the next three to 
eight years.4 But emerging markets in general are by no 
means a unified group, and in the coming years their 
economic performance is likely to diverge. Arguably, these 
countries are reaching an inflection point in their 
development where the growth model of their economies 
cannot continue to support the creation of wealth.5
Existing undertones of social unrest may be aggravated by 
externally driven economic shocks and the unsatisfactory 
implementation of far-reaching domestic reforms, even more 
so where political succession planning is unclear. While 
increased global trade and the faster movement of capital in 
a more integrated global economy generally support 
economic growth, they can expose countries to volatility 
induced by hot money flows, the fragility of traditional trading 
partners and a prolonged ebb in the commodity super-
cycle, resulting in financial system fragilities. Additional 
challenges will arise as countries allocate a more prominent 
role to market forces and extend welfare frameworks, 
especially where this rubs up against institutional inertia and 
vested interests in society.
As Figure 2.1 shows, popular discontent with the status quo 
is already apparent among rising middle classes, digitally 
connected youth populations and marginalized groups (for 
example, ethnic minorities and the new urban poor). 
Collectively, they want better services (such as healthcare), 
infrastructure, employment and working conditions. They 
also want greater accountability of public officials, better 
protected civil liberties and more equitable judicial systems. 
The misuse of power, official complacency and greater 
public awareness of widespread corruption have sharpened 
popular complaints. 
Figure 2.1: Countries with Social Unrest in 2013 (selected)
Source: Eurasia Group, Oliver Wyman, websites.
Note: Excludes military conflicts in Syria, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, etc.
Countries with major protests
COUNTRY FOCUS PARTICIPATION
Egypt Leadership 3,000,000
Turkey Urban development,
civil liberties
2,500,000
Brazil Bus fares, corruption 1,000,000
Argentina Judicial system 1,000,000
Ukraine Economic alliances 350,000
Chile Education system 
inequality
150,000
COUNTRY FOCUS PARTICIPATION
Thailand Corruption amnesty 
bill
150,000
South Africa Labour unrest 50,000
Russia Political prisoners 50,000
Bulgaria Energy bills, 
corruption
30,000
China Public services, etc. N/A
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Interstate Frictions – Commercial and Political
Domestic economic goals will increase pressure on 
international commercial partnerships. While global trade 
deals might be harder to come by, notwithstanding the 
success of the World Trade Ministerial Conference in Bali in 
December 2013, deals that involve smaller groups of 
countries are on the rise, with several extensive frameworks 
currently under negotiation (for example, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, TPP,  and Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, TTIP,  – see Figure 2.2). These aim for greater 
economic harmonization on standards and regulations, in 
addition to tariff reductions. For some governments, a 
significant political price will have to be paid for being on the 
inside, such as the opening up of protected industries, while 
others may face choices that will position their allegiances for 
years to come.
Some countries may use trade and investment relationships 
as a means of projecting geopolitical power and achieving 
strategic advantage. At the same time, pursuing geopolitical 
interests may damage economic confidence, notably in 
South-East Asia, where rising nationalist expectations and 
growing pressure on leaders for success is already affecting 
trade relations in key markets.6 Given the large number of 
potential flashpoints, political missteps may reduce trust and 
have lasting economic consequences. 
Proliferation of Low-level Conflict
Growing opportunities for asymmetrical warfare heighten the 
risk of national security crises. The risks for developed states 
posed by traditional forms of terrorism have proved less 
potent in recent years. At the same time, the number of 
attacks in the “south” has grown quite quickly and 
alarmingly. The risk is that terrorist activities in weak or fragile 
states can undermine states, cause unrest and then spill 
over into neighbouring countries, causing regional instability. 
Technology-based aggressions from state and non-state 
actors are on the rise.7 In the world of cyber warfare, 
strategic advantage will remain for the foreseeable future 
with aggressors – barring radical changes to the structure of 
the Internet (see Part 2.4) – with multiple incidents in every 
region of the world. Similarly, the inevitable spread of drone 
technology will create new hard-to-address capabilities for 
rogue actors – highlighted by the ability of a camera drone to 
get within three metres of German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
in September 2013. Multilateral agreements in these low-
level conflict areas would help to manage the associated 
risks, if not eliminate them.
Figure 2.2: New Regional Trade Alliances (selected)
Source: USTR 2011; and Thompson 2013. 
TPP 
TTIP 
Eurasian Union 
African Free Trade Zone
TPP
• Eliminate tariffs and barriers to the trade of goods and services 
• Facilitate the development of  production and supply chains
• Improve regulatory coherence
• Boost competitiveness
• Reduce tariffs 
• Align regulations and standards
• Improve protection for overseas investors
• Increase foreign access to services and government procurement 
   markets
TTIP
CURRENT NEGOTIATING COUNTRIES
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Moreover, in a world where fiscal constraints, legitimacy 
concerns and domestic demands compete for attention, 
established powers will be more reluctant to accept new 
responsibilities abroad. As a result, conflicts within and 
between states may more easily deteriorate into crises. 
Potential nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will continue 
to draw high-level political attention in Washington and in 
Europe. But the capacity to resolve problems elsewhere will 
likely depend on the creation of regional coalitions of the 
willing, able and like-minded, given regular impasses in the 
UN Security Council. This challenge may become especially 
complex in East and South-East Asia, a region that lacks a 
viable regional security framework and contains nations that 
still depend strongly on the US security “umbrella”.
Slow Progress on Global Challenges
Adding to the factors that will weigh on growth, the greater 
role of regional forums and tendencies towards de-
globalization may complicate progress towards sustainable 
global development. Cross-cutting, slow-burn, systemic 
challenges, such as climate change, widespread illicit trade, 
the management of the oceans (including a more accessible 
Arctic), Internet governance, international cooperation on 
space missions, and the enhancement of human rights, may 
prove more intractable when the prioritization of domestic 
economic and social concerns undermines the ability of 
states to coordinate and implement policy remedies. 
The persistent deadlock and declining expectations 
regarding international agreements on greenhouse gas 
emissions exemplify the difficulty in securing collective 
national self-sacrifice on topics that are not immediately 
pressing for all and subject to commonly held values. But 
policy uncertainty surely undermines the global investment 
environment and deepens scepticism about the ability and 
willingness of leaders to solve pressing transnational 
problems.
The growing scale and assertiveness of leading emerging 
market countries will increasingly challenge the legitimacy, 
relevance and efficacy of incumbent global multilateral 
organizations or groupings. Some already face accusations 
that they reflect an outdated post-Second World War 
balance of global power, while others are so large, 
ideologically diverse or financially constrained that decision-
making and implementation is hard to achieve. Re-
energizing their mandates and encouraging convergence on 
key goals would be a helpful counterpoint to topics that 
might best be handled at the regional level. 
Implications for Systemically Important 
Sectors
Geopolitical risks will not only affect the interaction between 
countries but will also affect, and be affected by, 
developments in three sectors that are critical to the well-
being of the global economy: energy, financial services and 
healthcare. Box 2.1 shows how key themes from the 
previous section play out in these areas. 
Box 2.1: Geopolitical Implications for Systemically Important Sectors
Energy 
Geopolitical and energy sector dynamics will remain deeply intertwined over the next decade as a number of key 
countries strive for greater energy independence, supply chain control and/or supply diversification. Over the coming 
decade, the US is likely to become the world’s top oil producer and a net exporter of natural gas (see Figure A).1 China is 
likely to extend its multiple strategic investments in energy assets across the Middle East, Africa and the Americas, and 
deepen its energy relationship with the Russian Federation. Many European nations, intent on diversifying by fuel type 
and supply countries, will strengthen their commitment to locally produced renewable energy and also the construction 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.
Figure A: Oil and Gas Production – US Focus (2010-2025)
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data from WEO 2011. 
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Source: US Energy Information Administration database.
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The implications for international relations are far-reaching. US energy self-sufficiency and lower feedstock prices are 
likely to encourage further onshoring of energy-intensive manufacturing. Reduced US dependency on the Middle East 
may shape perceptions of the region’s vulnerability to security crises, with other countries obliged to play greater roles. 
New unconventional oil supplies, along with financial pressures in emerging-market countries to boost production, will 
further limit the ability of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to set prices. More widely 
available LNG supplies could undermine the Russian Federation’s negotiating leverage with consumers in Europe and 
Asia. Washington may use LNG exports to achieve foreign policy goals – for example, to encourage the key energy 
growth markets of Asia to accept US terms for admission into the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
National oil companies are likely to expand their international reach (especially into Africa), using the financial and political 
backing of their governments to outbid international oil companies (IOCs) on assets, although IOCs will be better 
positioned for (joint) ventures, such as shale gas, where the latest technologies are required – provided the risks of 
intellectual property loss and potentially escalating royalties can be managed. In some parts of the world, domestic 
concerns about local content, employment and energy prices may delay or derail the market reforms needed to facilitate 
energy sector collaborations and investment in infrastructure. In Europe, policy uncertainty resulting from the desire to 
balance price objectives and environmental commitments may result in inefficient energy systems featuring stranded 
assets, continued subsidization, investment delays and higher levels of government interference.
Financial services 
Stability will be a key objective in this sector. Advanced economies will focus on implementing major reforms designed to 
improve market resilience. The application of reform principles is already politicized, with domestically drafted regulations 
(e.g. Dodd-Frank) set up to protect national financial systems at the expense of extraterritorial institutions.2 The drive 
towards regional harmonization by the European Union (EU) is set to continue, generating political friction as members 
seek to protect their national interests, an example being the negotiation of safeguards in the EU banking union and 
market legislation by the United Kingdom (UK). 
The complex interplay between layers of regulation and the differences between regimes and philosophies – for 
example, the UK’s values-based approach versus the US’s rules-based approach – will increase friction and costs 
related to compliance, transactions and reporting. This may encourage institutions to reconsider the scope and footprint 
of their operations. Likewise, the deleveraging of the regulated financial system, via higher capital requirements, might 
force increasing amounts of financial activity outside the regulatory parameter into the shadow banking system in the 
pursuit of higher returns. 
In emerging-market countries, the extent of financial sector liberalization will be shaped by three factors: recognition of 
the importance of the financial sector as a strategic area of growth; the country’s ability to deliver substantial structural 
economic reform without significant domestic instability; and the strength of domestic financial lobbies. Countries that 
do open up are likely to set a relatively higher bar to entry for foreign institutions, both to prevent distortions and to 
protect domestic incumbents. 
While some measures – such as the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries with local capital and governance – 
should limit systemic risk impacts, other measures may inhibit innovation that could support economic growth. A 
measured approach to liberalization may help some countries avoid stop-start policies, as seen in Brazil’s insurance 
market, as well as reduce the risk of the unwelcome macroeconomic consequences that come with hot money and 
incorrectly sequenced reforms, notably inflationary pressures, exchange rate appreciation and asset-price bubbles.3
Leading emerging markets may increasingly seek to position themselves as regional financial centres and reduce their 
vulnerability to volatile foreign capital flows while increasing their domestic investor base. To attract talent and capital, 
regional hubs – existing (such as Hong Kong SAR and Singapore) and aspiring (including Istanbul, Shanghai, Moscow, 
Johannesburg and Dubai) – will need to strategically identify the areas in which they will specialize to better understand 
the opportunities and risks presented by partners and competitors. 
Healthcare 
Due to slower economic growth, healthcare funding will be a defining challenge for all countries over the next 10 years. 
Ageing populations and the persistent rise in chronic and lifestyle diseases (see Figure B) will force both developed and 
emerging economies to transform provisions and how they are paid for.
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Figure B: Projected Increase in Number of People with Diabetes Aged 20-79 (2013 vs 2035) 
 
In emerging markets, any failure to create sustainable universal healthcare systems – a constitutional obligation in Brazil 
and Turkey, and a stated ambition in India, Indonesia and South Africa – may arouse social unrest. In developed 
markets, a failure to transform care would threaten the implied social contract with citizens and imperil countries’ abilities 
to finance other public priorities, such as foreign policy. Future cost pressures are likely to fall increasingly on employers 
and insurance programmes, with an increasing role for the financial sector in all countries.  
Necessary reforms in the health sector could have geopolitical implications. A shortage of qualified physicians could 
increase poaching between countries. Inefficient, localized models of care may give way to consolidated structures. 
Increasing cost pressures are likely to broaden the supply and demand of health tourism, with the potential for large cost 
savings. Innovations in care delivery models, such as more radically separating acute specialist care from more remote 
monitoring / telemedicine could further open up provision of healthcare.4 A sharper policy focus on lifestyle 
improvements could affect the global food production industry, among others. 
It is likely that emerging markets will pragmatically open up investment opportunities for foreign firms in healthcare and 
pharmaceutical provision, albeit sometimes in partnership arrangements. Foreign involvement will probably be blocked 
in areas that are easily managed domestically, such as the production of simple generic drugs, though more complex 
areas, such as biologics, may well remain open. Requirements for technology transfer and assistance for local research 
and development (R&D) are likely to intensify, however – as is apparent in the Russian Federation’s Pharma 2020 
strategy.5 
Cost pressures in these countries are likely to lead to the increasing use of compulsory licences, harder scrutiny of 
pharmaceutical patents and demands for transparency on pricing, as well as controversial pricing mechanisms to lower 
drug costs. India has already implemented such measures, and similar approaches are anticipated in Brazil, South 
Africa and possibly China. Rather than taking a blanket protectionist stance, it is likely that governments will target the 
drugs that cost them the most money, such as those for oncology. This pressure, already echoed in such developed 
countries as Germany, asks big questions about the feasibility of large-scale research and development work and thus 
the ability to meet future healthcare needs. 
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Notes
1 IEA 2013; and US Energy Information Administration 2013, Annual Energy 
Outlook. Available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.
2 Oliver Wyman 2012a.
3 University of Pennsylvania: The Wharton School 2013b. 
4 Oliver Wyman 2012b.
5 The strategy can be found at http://pharma2020.ru/. For an appraisal in 
English, see the Analytical Summary from the Swiss Embassy at http://
www.s-ge.com/de/filefield-private/files/25703/field_blog_public_files/5244.
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Strengthening Resilience
Navigating through a fractured and potentially volatile 
geopolitical environment will require foresight, flexibility and 
fresh thinking for countries, companies and multilateral 
organizations alike. In the face of potential surprises and 
reversals, the agile and the adaptable are most likely to 
thrive.
Given the potential for reversals and unwelcome surprises, 
strategic diversification will be critical. Just as governments 
should avoid relying on individual security, trade and 
investment partnerships, so companies should take a 
portfolio view of their risk exposures to particular markets 
and seek natural hedges against them. 
Successful risk mitigation for all participants will also involve 
a constant challenge to engage and communicate more 
deeply. Legitimacy will be increasingly important for 
multilateral organizations, accountability for governments 
and transparency for companies. When these aspects are 
not adequately addressed, loss of trust will have significant 
political and economic consequences.
Broad-based coalitions, where they are not overly ambitious, 
may help to overcome new barriers that could emerge from 
the focus on domestic priorities. Multistakeholder initiatives 
may increasingly prove key to building consensus, unlocking 
capital and developing innovative solutions to national, 
regional and global challenges. It will often be important to 
nurture relations with all useful partners, regardless of 
political differences. But careful alignment in areas of mutual 
benefit will enable participants to harness a wide range of 
future opportunities.
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2.3 Generation Lost?
Around the world, the generation coming of age in the 2010s 
is most affected by the legacy of the financial crisis and slow 
economic growth. In many countries, dramatically high 
unemployment is frustrating young people’s efforts to earn, 
generate savings, gain professional experience and build 
careers. Traditional higher education is ever more expensive 
and its payoff more doubtful. These issues need to be 
addressed inclusively on local, national and global levels to 
minimize the risks of a breakdown in social cohesion and 
enduring loss of human and economic potential. 
In general, the mentality of this generation is realistic, 
adaptive and versatile. Smart technology and social media 
provide new ways to quickly connect, build communities, 
voice opinion and exert political pressure.8 This generation of 
digital natives is full of ambition to make the world a better 
place, yet feels disconnected from traditional politics and 
government – a combination which presents both a 
challenge and an opportunity in addressing global risks.
A Generation at Risk
The generational frame in this chapter focuses on a cohort 
aged roughly between 13 and 23 in 2013. It will be aged 
about 23 to 33 in 2023. This category overlaps with the 
millennials or the millennial generation, defined as those born 
between 1980 and 2000.9 
Young people entering the job market today are at high risk 
of unemployment or precarious job situations. Youth 
unemployment rates have soared since the financial crisis. 
The situation is especially dire in the Middle East and 
advanced economies, notably some European countries 
such as Spain and Greece. Moreover, employment statistics 
do not reveal that in many developing regions – where 90% 
of the global youth population lives – a majority of young 
people are employed only informally.10
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In advanced economies, jobs with long-term prospects – the 
normal situation for previous generations – have become 
scarce. Young people are vulnerable to being entrapped by 
either long-term unemployment or the inability to move on 
from low-quality and temporary or part-time employment.11 
In advanced economies, the challenge of finding stable and 
remunerative employment comes on top of the burden of 
fulfilling the social contract with an ageing society. Today’s 
youth need to support a growing population of the elderly 
and save for their own old age. This burden is carried to 
extremes in Japan, a country with one of the world’s highest 
life expectancies and lowest birth rates, due partly to the lack 
of widespread support structures for young families. 
Prospects for the young generation are brighter in high-
growth markets, particularly in Asia, where the middle 
classes are rising. Yet – as explored in the previous section 
– the transition of these economies from emerging to 
advanced is not without problems, including the same 
demographic burden which afflicts advanced economies. 
Emerging markets may not have a top-heavy age structure 
yet, but soon will. While it took 115 years for France’s 
population of over-65s to double from 7% to 14%, it will take 
China, South Korea and Singapore only about 20 years.12
Figure 2.3: Youth Unemployment Rate by Region  
(2007-2013)  
Source: ILO 2013b. 
Note: 2012 and 2013 are projections.
World
Developed Economies
and European Union
East Asia
South-East Asia and the Pacific
South Asia
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East
North Africa
Central and South-Eastern Europe
(non-EU) and CIS
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
30
25
20
15
10
5
Yo
ut
h 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e 
(%
)
In contrast to most advanced nations, the developing 
economies of China, Latin America and Africa face additional 
pressures of population growth as rural-urban migration 
creates megacities with complex risks and vulnerabilities 
(see Part 1 – Box 1.5 on urbanization and risk).13 Africa’s 
youth population, for example, currently totals 200 million 
and is projected to double by 2045.14 Sufficient economic 
opportunities will need to be generated to absorb this 
growing and increasingly better-educated labour force. In 
many countries, the young need to adapt quickly as 
traditional societies change and new skills are required; skills 
mismatch is a particular problem in Africa and the Middle 
East. The growth of populations and cities puts pressure on 
food production, so the prospects for a young generation of 
farmers also need to be addressed. 
Young people in low-income economies usually cannot 
benefit from social protection systems. The extent of 
unemployment and underemployment risks generating 
social instability, especially in post-conflict settings or fragile 
states, is evidenced by the Arab Spring. Nearly two-thirds of 
the youth in developing economies are not achieving their full 
economic potential, which holds back these economies.15
In some emerging economies, demographic shifts mean the 
relative supply of labour will be decreasing within a decade 
or two. In China, for example, the number of university 
graduates currently exceeds market demand in many 
regions, but the situation is projected to flip by 2020 with 
demographic change and the shift from industries to 
services. Very quickly, demand for skilled and educated 
people is expected to exceed supply.16 
This will ease the problems of unemployment and 
underemployment for the next generation, but many of the 
current generation may remain “lost” in unstable, low-paid 
and low-productivity jobs in the informal economy. Access to 
lifelong education is a possible solution, but requires 
addressing wider problems in the education sector.
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Box 2.2: Acquiring Productive Skills without Losing the Bigger Picture
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Education & Skills
Demand for higher education is set to grow in the coming decades. Secondary school graduates will increase in number 
and a rising share will strive to continue their schooling at the tertiary level in pursuit of “good jobs”. 
Unfortunately, these future students have no guarantee that their tertiary education will actually equip them with the skills 
they need to fill those jobs. Many current graduates are discovering that despite their academic qualifications – often 
gained at significant expense – they lack the specific technical and professional skills demanded by the ever-changing  
jobs market. 
An obvious response to this problem is to reform the traditional model of academic universities aimed at the middle classes 
in advanced economies so that it places more emphasis on professional and vocational education and training. Many 
countries that score highly on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index have such systems, which can 
be adapted to the needs of emerging economies where much of the increase in demand for tertiary education will be 
centred. 
As the resource-strapped public sector struggles to meet rising demand for higher education, it is also likely that for-profit 
institutions will play a growing supply role. The necessarily high tuition and fees at many such institutions may lead them 
naturally to focus on the preparation of jobs-ready graduates, at the expense of disciplines with less attractive career 
payoffs, such as the arts and humanities.
This, in turn, raises the risk of eroding higher education’s role as a vital space for social discourse. As well as producing 
graduates with specific skills demanded by the labour market, societies need graduates who can engage in informed and 
thoughtful discussions of values and norms. An interconnected world cannot afford to neglect nurturing a new generation 
of well-informed opinion leaders who can guide societies in beneficial directions.
The challenge is not only to prepare the future workforce, but to do so in a way that preserves the role of higher education 
in focusing minds on the bigger picture. 
The Future of Education
As public finances come under pressure, the rising costs of 
higher education are increasingly borne by the individual. 
Many graduates in developed economies leave university 
not only highly educated but also highly indebted.17 
Unfortunately, many then struggle to find their way into 
careers commensurate with their education levels or 
sufficiently remunerated to pay off their debts. According to 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), under-30s in 
advanced economies are far more likely than over-30s to be 
taking up jobs for which they are overqualified. Often they 
change frequently from one temporary job to another. Even 
before the crisis, the term “Generation 700 Euros” had 
become a common way to describe this phenomenon in 
Greece.18
If potential students perceive higher education as a risky 
investment, they may increasingly embark on university 
degrees only if their families are able to offer financial 
support. Higher education has traditionally been a way of 
reducing income disparities by enabling people to move up 
the social ladder, but it may now be starting to entrench 
income disparities instead, with potentially dire 
consequences for social cohesion. Some of the challenges 
higher education institutions face are discussed in Box 2.2.
Highly indebted students who cannot find a career allowing 
them to pay back their debts will not be in a position to save 
for the future, storing up trouble for social safety nets. They 
will also be reluctant to take on more financial risk to re-
educate or invest in a start-up, which could potentially 
reduce the dynamism of economies. 
Fortunately, the disruptive role of technology may ultimately 
restore the equalizing role of higher education. The spread of 
high-speed Internet is opening up access to free or 
inexpensive quality online courses. Such courses also 
promise to help make education and further training a 
lifelong possibility in developed as well as developing 
economies, enabling people to update their skills in 
response to the fast-changing job markets of modern 
knowledge economies.
Educational establishments and businesses also need to 
work together to ease the school-to-work transition. The 
professional education system needs to be revised in many 
countries. A dual education system, such as in Germany and 
Switzerland – with professional education on the job and 
parallel education at a vocational school – may lower many 
of the barriers and risks depicted above. Other models for 
public-private partnerships to mitigate risks for effective 
investment in skills and training are at hand.19
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Figure 2.4: The Swiss Dual System of Vocational and Professional Education and Training (VET/PET)
Source: Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology (OPET) based on Kammermann 2010. 
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Pragmatism and Political Engagement
A recent global opinion survey sheds light on the awareness, 
priorities and values of global youth.20 All around the world, 
young people are well aware of the challenges, such as 
pressures on old-age pensions, an increase in the 
occurrence and intensity of natural catastrophes, meeting 
the energy needs of the world in 2050 or feeding 9 billion 
people. Indeed, this survey confirms the result of the Global 
Risks Perception Survey, where young people under 30 
came across as more concerned with risks on average and 
with environmental risks in particular. 
The breadth and homogeneity of their awareness speaks of 
their high level of interconnectedness. Global events are 
quickly brought to the local level, often with a personal touch 
due to friends in social networks.21 These personal channels 
filter the world of the “digital natives” – the first generation to 
be brought up with everyday communication and information 
dominated by Web browsers and smartphones.22
Another picture repeated over the world is that young people 
look for solutions first among themselves and second in the 
circle of family and friends. They are willing to invest more in 
private pension schemes, rely on close personal contacts in 
case of natural catastrophes, want to do more to prevent 
food waste and are willing to invest in clean energy sources. 
What does not appear on their radar screen of solutions is 
the state or government. They think independently of this 
basic fallback system of the older generation – governments 
providing a safety net.23 
This points to a wider distrust of authorities and institutions. 
The mindset of this age cohort has been shaped by 
experiences such as the apparent helplessness of 
governments in the face of the recent economic downturn 
and recent revelations about online spying by US intelligence 
agencies.24 Anti-austerity movements and other protests 
give voice to an increasing distrust in current socio-
economic and political systems. The young are an important 
constituent of the general disappointment felt in many 
nations with regional and global governance bodies such as 
the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
This generation draws confidence for taking things into their 
own hands from the technical developments they 
experienced while growing up. The digital revolution gave 
them unprecedented access to knowledge and information 
worldwide. They are used to collaborating and sharing, and 
addressing global issues on their respective local levels. 
They value collaboration and transparency, are able to build 
abstract networks addressing single issues and place less 
importance on traditionally organized political parties and 
leadership. 
The challenge for those in positions of authority in existing 
institutions is to find ways to engage the young generation. 
Young people’s enthusiasm to address global risks is there 
to be tapped, but they will engage in conventional 
governance only if mechanisms to do so can be devised to 
fit with their new ways of operating.
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Investing in the Future 
What can be done to mitigate intergenerational tension arising 
from demographic and economic pressures on welfare 
systems? How can the millennial and post-millennial 
generations be socially better protected? 
First, youth must be prioritized in political agendas. The 
younger generation needs jobs and career opportunities and 
adequate education, as discussed in Box 2.3, as well as 
power in political forums and discourse. Only if young people 
see and get a chance to make a living, a career – or just a 
liveable life – will they integrate into the global society. This will 
be a prerequisite to regain the trust of the youth and 
encourage their participation in societal and political 
institutions, authorities and leadership.
Second, a systemic environment that fosters long-term 
investments will be crucial to prevent this young generation 
from being lost. To bridge the pension and social protection 
gap affecting the young, countries will have to strengthen 
both the economic security of the young generation and 
ensure robustness of old-age pension systems. In emerging 
markets, the challenge is to put systems in place to ensure 
that the current youth will not have to face the same problems 
as their counterparts in advanced economies. 
Box 2.3: The Challenge of Youth Unemployment
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Youth Unemployment
Urgent, bold and collective action is required to promote job creation and address the skills mismatch. Government, business, 
education, civil society and the financial sector all have a role to play.
 
About 300 million young people – over 25% of the world’s youth population – have no productive work, according to World 
Bank estimates.1  An unprecedented demographic “youth bulge” is bringing more than 120 million new young people on to the 
job market each year, mostly in the developing world.2
Youth unemployment on this scale is not only a waste of human capital and potential but also threatens to halt economic 
progress, creating a vicious cycle of less economic activity and more unemployment. It also raises the risk of social unrest by 
creating a disaffected “lost generation” who are vulnerable to being sucked into criminal or extremist movements. 
Part of the problem is that economic growth is no longer generating enough of the skilled and stable jobs that previous 
generations took for granted. This is a by-product of years of technological advances and globalization, along with labour 
market regulations that incentivize companies to prefer retaining older workers to hiring new ones. 
Of course, technology is also creating many new jobs, businesses and even industries. These jobs demand more from 
workers than basic skills, but there is a growing skills mismatch. In a recent global survey, one in three employers claimed to 
have trouble filling open positions with qualified candidates. Many school leavers lack both the specific credentials and “soft” 
skills – such as critical thinking, problem solving, time management and communication – they need to compete for jobs or 
become entrepreneurs. 
Concerted effort is required to match education and training to the new digital opportunities. Technology is a significant aspect 
of the employment landscape and opportunity for young people, and one that government and the private sector can directly 
nurture and support at both the national and sub-national levels. Governments, for example, can mobilize stakeholders behind 
properly funded national action plans with measurable outcomes, and look for ways to incentivize employers to hire younger 
workers.
The private sector can guide curriculum and training programme design by communicating about projected skills needs. 
Businesses can work with the educational sector to establish partnerships with schools and improve apprenticeship 
opportunities. Educational and civil society organizations, in partnership with industry, can prioritize entrepreneurship 
education, soft skills and earlier delivery of sector-relevant and professional skills in schools, all of which promote employability. 
There are encouraging examples: Serbia’s National Action Plan for Youth Employment has been cited as a model by the 
Council of Europe, while Germany’s apprenticeships programme has helped cut its youth unemployment rate to less than half 
the European average. 
Successful initiatives need to be urgently replicated and scaled up to solve this complex, cross-sector challenge. Youth 
employment policies must also be designed and implemented with the experience of the youth in mind to understand their 
attitudes and abilities.
Notes 
 
1 Newhouse, D. 2013. “New Estimates of Youth Idleness and Employment Outcomes in Developing Countries”. mimeo. Social Protection and Labor. Washington 
DC: The World Bank.
2 Ortiz, I. and M. Cummins. 2012. When the Global Crisis and Youth Bulge Collide: Double the Jobs Trouble for Youth. UNICEF. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/
socialpolicy/files/Global_Crisis_and_Youth_Bulge_-_FINAL.pdf. 
 
Source
For more details on the recommendations made by the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Youth Unemployment, see The Future at Risk, 
available at http://www.weforum.org/content/global-agenda-council-youth-unemployment-2012-2014.
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Third, political and regulatory conditions need to be adjusted 
to strengthen and incentivize investments with a long-term 
perspective.25 Companies and financial systems need to give 
greater priority to their long-term resilience and look beyond 
short reporting cycles, as explored in Part 2.5.26 At the same 
time, opportunities must be enhanced for individuals to build 
assets, to save and to invest. 
The public and private sectors can work together to foster 
lending and investment with long-term perspective. The 
insurance industry can play a central role in risk mitigation for 
entrepreneurs and collectives, but governments and 
international institutions have to facilitate intergenerational 
asset transfer as well. Only fair and sustainable systems of 
tax and subsidy redistribution will ensure growth that also 
encompasses social protection, remedies poverty and 
allows for resource-friendly and environmentally sound 
development.
Finally, migration needs to be managed with a long-term and 
global perspective. Migration can reallocate skilled 
workforces, providing an opportunity to address the skills 
mismatch, but with the risk of brain drain in the countries 
from which skilled labour migrates.27 To make migration a 
win-win situation for the country of origin and the receiving 
economy, it is crucial to incentivize a subsequent return of 
the skilled emigrants to their country of origin and to 
strengthen the related international agreements. 
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2.4 Digital Disintegration
While cyberspace has proved largely resilient to attacks and 
other disruptions so far, its underlying dynamic has always 
been such that attackers have an easier time than 
defenders. There are reasons to believe that resilience is 
gradually being undermined, allowing this dynamic of 
vulnerability to become more impactful. 
First, the growth of the “Internet of Things” means that ever 
more devices are being connected online, touching many 
more parts of life and widening both the potential entry 
points for and impacts of disruption. Second, there is 
ever-deepening complexity of interactions among the many 
aspects of life that are dependent on connected devices, 
making those impacts potentially harder to predict. 
Together, these twin trends demand new thinking about 
global governance of the Internet. Yet the prospect of 
achieving this has been undermined by recent revelations 
about the extent to which national security organizations are 
shaping cyber policy and conducting espionage and 
attacks, eroding trust among the very stakeholders whose 
collaboration will be necessary to avert a conceivable 
“Cybergeddon”. 
Offence vs Defence in Cyberspace
Cyber risks are not new. It was written in 1988 that 
“espionage over networks can be cost-efficient, offer nearly 
immediate results, and target specific locations … insulated 
from risks of internationally embarrassing incidents.”28 
Warnings about a “cyber Pearl Harbor” extend back to 
1991.29 However, although online espionage and crime 
remain daily issues, cyberspace has so far been resilient to 
truly disruptive infrastructure attacks, those that could break 
systems or societies and not just pilfer information. 
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Cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are 
either widespread but fleeting (such as the Morris Worm, 
which took down an estimated 10% of the early Internet) or 
persistent but narrowly focused (like the 2007 attacks on 
Estonia). No attacks or even failures have been both 
widespread and persistent. This is due to robust standards 
and networks, high levels of investment and the ability of the 
technical community to flock to and overwhelm disruptions 
(such as undersea cable outages). Such feats are possible 
only due to the open and participative structure of the 
Internet, driven by non-state actors such as incidence 
response teams and service providers. 
Nonetheless, risks to the Internet continue to grow more 
serious for one key reason: attacking others in cyberspace 
(breaking into or disrupting their system) has always been 
easier than defending them. The offence has had the 
advantage over the defence. This dynamic is in part historic: 
the Internet was built for resilience rather than security, since 
everyone using it in the earliest days was trusted. But the 
practical underlying dynamic – an attacker needs only to find 
a single way through defences at a single point in time, while 
the defender must defend all vulnerable points forever – 
increasingly threatens to undermine that resilience. 
Many companies use a “red team”, or penetration testers, to 
try to break into their own online systems to improve their 
security. This practice dates back to at least 1979, when the 
ARPANet had not yet become the Internet and TCP/IP 
protocols were not yet standard. As one report put it back 
then: “Few, if any, contemporary computer security controls 
have prevented a [red team] from easily accessing any 
information sought.”30 The same remains true today, and 
cyber risks will likely continue to get more serious, year after 
year, until global stakeholders can upturn this underlying 
dynamic or restore trust. 
This is not impossible. In physical warfare, the dynamic 
between attackers and defenders has flip-flopped with 
inventions such as the machine gun and the tank. It will, 
however, be made more difficult by the online world’s 
increasing interconnectedness and complexity. 
Interconnectedness, Complexity and 
Systemic Risks
A threat to the Internet increasingly means a threat to 
everything. Every part of the world’s societies and 
economies uses the same underlying infrastructure, the 
same hardware, software and standards with billions of 
devices connected to the Internet, from simple e-book 
readers to electrical distribution networks.31 
In the past, cyber attacks typically had only a limited effect 
because they broke only ones and zeroes or things made of 
silicon. Organizations under attack might have a bad week, 
but after that they generally could execute business 
continuity plans, rebuild computers and use data from 
securely backed-up vaults. However, projects such as the 
Smart Grid – online connection of electrical power 
generation and transmission – are increasing the possibility 
of cyber attacks breaking things made of concrete and steel. 
As Rod Beckstrom, former President of Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), puts it: 
“Everything that is connected to the Internet can be hacked, 
and everything is being connected to the Internet.”32 This 
growing hyperconnectivity raises the prospect of disruptions 
having systemic impact. Previous publications from the 
World Economic Forum have highlighted that 
interdependence introduces new vulnerabilities and 
opportunities for failures cascading from unexpected 
directions.33 This can have far-reaching impacts: “When the 
shock to the system is greater than what the system can 
tolerate, the number of functions the system can perform 
may decrease dramatically.”34 
What kinds of disruption are possible? Cyber risks are often 
summarized through the acronym CHEW – crime, 
hacktivists, espionage and war.35 But there are other risks in 
cyberspace that could have systemic impacts. For example, 
a large cloud provider could suffer an Enron- or Lehman-
style failure virtually overnight. 
Environmental triggers could also easily play a role, 
especially given the inherent fragility of the underlying 
physical infrastructure. A long-dreaded earthquake on the 
San Andreas fault could devastate the world’s technical 
centre of Silicon Valley. A solar super-storm could cause 
substantial outages of national grids, satellites, avionics or 
signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). The 
growing mass of “space junk” in orbit around the earth also 
poses a threat to GNSS.
A surprising number of critical systems rely on GNSS, 
including emergency 911 calls, ATMs and other financial 
infrastructure, and both wired and wireless communications 
networks.36 Wireless is fast becoming the vital “last few 
metres” of Internet connection, and there are growing 
concerns that government sell-offs of the radio spectrum 
may have made it more vulnerable to interruption. The World 
Radiocommunication Conference in 2015 will analyse the 
extent and potential consequences of this nascent risk.
Disruption to the critical systems that rely on GNSS could 
have significant cascading effects while workarounds are 
found for systems that now depend on hyperconnectivity, 
since fewer and fewer people now remember the old 
pen-and-paper ways of doing things. Risks arising from 
hyperconnectivity urgently require multistakeholder 
collaboration, but trust among stakeholders is under 
pressure. 
The Role of National Security 
Organizations 
Recent months have seen a series of revelations about the 
online role of national security organizations. The 
militarization of cyberspace was already common 
knowledge: over 30 nations have a published cyber warfare 
doctrine, with 12 having formal organizations (such as the US 
Cyber Command).37 However, wider understanding of the 
extent to which national security organizations have allegedly 
been using the Internet for espionage now threatens 
repercussions that may make it more difficult to prevent 
widespread attacks, or contain them when they occur. 
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For national security organizations, the dynamic of attackers 
having the advantage over defenders brings advantages of 
being able to spy anonymously on their adversaries. 
However, by the same logic, nations are also vulnerable to 
the use of such tactics by others. Immediate benefits to 
national security come at the price of more long-term cyber 
risk for interconnected societies and economies.
An increasing erosion – or even eventual breakdown – of 
international trust seems a natural consequence. A lack of 
trust and confidence helped to accelerate the financial crisis 
(such as when nations limited the amount of help their banks 
could give to subsidiaries in other nations) and could prove 
similarly disastrous when dealing with international cyber 
shocks. 
There are already signs that revelations about the role of 
national security organizations have exacerbated risks of 
fragmentation of the Internet, which could lead to an overall 
erosion of the factors that led cyberspace to be so 
transformational in the first place. In the early days of the 
Internet, the interests of industry, governments and society 
largely converged. Now that the stakes are higher, these 
interests are diverging and conflicting, which can lead to 
suboptimal solutions, reduced innovation and investment, 
and a risk of a fragmentation of the Internet; for example, 
through the imposition of strong national boundaries where 
none currently exists. 
This trend is already apparent, most clearly with the 
approach China has taken, but also with reports that the US 
government may have leveraged US-based IT and telecom 
companies as part of national security surveillance efforts. 
As nations are increasingly distrustful of the US government 
not to look at their data if it is stored in or transits that nation, 
they are more likely to follow the lead of Brazil or the EU to 
consider erecting laws to ensure that data on their citizens 
does not leave their own jurisdictions. 
Concerns about the US hosting ICANN, the main 
governance body for the Internet, could further fuel a 
Balkanization of the Internet. This trend is also apparent in 
corporate “walled gardens” that attempt to lock users in or 
restrict what software can be run in the walled environment, 
and provisions by governments to block preferential market 
access to IT firms in other countries. 
The main casualty of US spying allegations may not be US 
relations with Germany or Brazil, but people’s trust in their 
government’s integrity on online privacy. Young people 
around the world, disillusioned with traditional politics and 
authorities as explained in the previous section of this report, 
may increasingly see governments as an online aggressor to 
be confronted. Behaviour such as online spying that national 
governments and the Cold War generations might see as 
business-as-usual are likely to be seen as much more 
personal affronts today. 
This complex interconnection of issues touches on multiple 
interacting layers – standards, infrastructure, data and 
derived knowledge – which have outpaced the adaptive 
ability of the world’s governance response. Certainly the 
governance approaches will have to change, which could 
have a profound effect on the value that society could and 
should expect from the Internet in a more hyperconnected 
world.
The Worst-case Scenario: 
“Cybergeddon”
While it is possible for the balance of advantage between 
attackers and defenders to flip, it is also possible for it to 
become more pronounced. A future in which attackers − 
whether hackers, organized-crime groups or national 
militaries − have an overwhelming, dominant and lasting 
advantage over defenders could be just one disruptive 
technology away.
Attackers in this future could achieve a wide range of effects 
with little input, making large-scale, Internet-wide disruptions 
easy and common. The Internet would cease to be a trusted 
medium for communication or commerce and would be 
increasingly abandoned by consumers and enterprises. 
Cyberspace would no longer be divided between attackers 
and defenders but between predators and prey. 
Worse yet, this situation could become entrenched as 
the increasingly fragmented nature of the Internet 
stymies attempts to reach global agreement on new, 
more secure technologies or standards. Cooperation 
among nations or non-governmental organizations 
would become similarly useless either because there is 
rampant mistrust in creating newer security standards 
or because attackers are ubiquitous, relentless and 
triumphant. A technology company has explored this 
future in a scenario called “Insecure Growth”: “This is a 
world in which users – individuals and business alike 
– are scared away from intensive reliance on the 
Internet. Relentless cyber attacks driven by wide-
ranging motivations defy the preventive capabilities of 
governments and international bodies. Secure 
alternatives emerge, but they are discriminating  
and expensive.” 38
This future has also been called a “Cybergeddon”.39 The next 
generation could grow up with a cyberspace that is less 
open, less resilient and fundamentally less valuable than the 
one existing today. The most transformative technology 
since Gutenberg would regress, to the loss of societies, 
economies and humanity. Piecemeal, individual solutions 
generally fail to address the underlying systemic issue: the 
mismatch between attackers and defenders. The world will 
not be able simply to secure, risk-manage or information-
share its way out of this situation to tip the balance of 
advantage towards defenders. 
Even if international trust were to be rebuilt, attackers would 
still retain the advantage and new solutions would need to be 
found. Global stakeholders should be under no illusion that 
bigger budgets, more information-sharing or more regulation 
will make much difference. To shift the advantage to the 
defenders will require new thinking, and soon. 
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Box 2.4: Towards Measurement of Cyber Risks
As constant digital connectivity becomes the new norm in economies and societies, there is a need to “normalize” cyber 
risks. A critical step in advancing the collective capacity to manage systemic risks will be to develop methodologies to 
measure and price these risks. Efforts to quantify such risks are needed, and in some cases have started, at  
multiple levels.
At the enterprise level, moving towards a risk-based approach for dealing with cyber threats and vulnerabilities will require 
improved methods to deal with such risks in line with broader enterprise risk management practices of the kind discussed 
in Part 2.5. Many organizations are already attempting to evolve their internal practices in this regard, and collaboration 
among companies to share ideas can also be observed. 
A number of challenges must be overcome in such efforts. Not least of these is capturing the full range of potential 
vulnerabilities – connected supply chains, outsourcing and other factors make the idea of the “enterprise network” 
somewhat fluid – as well as determining the scope of impact, on stock prices or reputation, for example.
Given the implied value of “intangibles and goodwill” threatened by cyber events, there would seem to be considerable 
opportunity for the nascent cyber risk insurance market to evolve and mature. While insurance companies are no 
strangers to underwriting events with a high degree of uncertainty, improved and standardized methods to capture and 
account for risks at the enterprise level would clearly aid the development of this market. Other non-insurance, risk-transfer 
markets could also be imagined; some central banks have begun to consider potential systemic risks posed by  
cyber attacks.
Research has also started on understanding the macroeconomic impact of cyber risks on national competitiveness, GDP 
and growth. Countries’ ability to drive competitiveness through technology has been documented by the Forum’s Global 
Information Technology Report for many years, while other studies have focused on the Internet’s contribution to national 
GDP. However, there are emerging research discussions on specifically measuring a country’s readiness or capacity to 
deal with cyber risks, as well as the economic impact of slowed business investments due to concerns over such risks. 
Finally, further research is required on the impact of concerns about cyber risks on global trade flows and output. Security 
concerns can lead to, or be used to defend, protectionist positions that can have a negative impact on trading relations. 
Should such concerns result in a fragmented policy landscape or the Balkanization of the Internet, global trade will suffer.
A Question of Trust
Increasingly, there is recognition that the growing role of 
cyberspace is not only a technical and geopolitical concern 
but also presents serious risks to economic well-being. 
While the failure of critical online infrastructure represents a 
systemic risk that could impact global growth, so does a 
large-scale loss of trust in the Internet. Stakeholders may 
need to move beyond traditional solutions, with fresher ideas 
that can scale and move away from a national security 
mindset. 
Thinking of cyberspace in economic terms offers several 
advantages. Economic cooperation and recognition of the 
gains from global trade has provided a positive platform to 
promote global international relations, rather than focusing 
on narrow national interests and protectionism. This can be 
directly applicable to cyber risks. Protecting the “common 
good” of the Internet creates strong economic incentives 
among the youngest generation, the “digital natives”.
Of course, the economic frame is more than an analogy. 
Many corporations already think of cyber risks in terms of 
reputational and stock-price impacts, raising the issue to the 
strategic level that an effective strategy requires. Some 
countries, too, have taken explicit steps to position 
themselves as safe places to do business in the digital age, 
integrating cybersecurity with capacity building. 
Many of the gains already seen from globalization would not 
have been possible without the Internet. Much of the 
innovation and promise of growth foreseen in the coming 
years is also predicated on an Internet as integrated as it is 
today, and similar levels of trust. These innovations are 
occurring at all levels, from entire industries (e.g. the 
“connected car”) to individual entrepreneurs in emerging and 
developing economies around the world.
The economic perspective does not preclude other 
perspectives. Geopolitical, military and technical dialogue 
will still need to continue. But to the extent that stakeholders 
can recognize the tremendous gains from a stable, secure 
and resilient Internet, the space for constructive discourse 
can be expanded and a useful context provided for 
discussions on protecting cyberspace.
A critical element in advancing this discussion will be 
improving the collective ability to measure the economic 
impact of cyber risks, at all levels – within individual 
businesses, nationally and globally (see Box 2.4). Effective 
methods for measuring and pricing cyber risks may even 
lead to new market-based risk management structures, 
which would help in understanding the systemic 
interdependencies in the multiple domains that now depend 
on cyberspace.
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2.5 Strategies for Managing 
Global Risks
The previous sections have explored ways in which global 
risks could play out in the next decade – geopolitical turmoil, 
the potentially far-reaching effects of youth unemployment 
and cyber vulnerabilities. Many other ways are possible.
Firms must distinguish between risks they can only hope to 
manage, and risks they can also hope to address through 
collaborative action; a consistent message of this report is 
that global risks are best addressed collaboratively. 
However, firms cannot rely on others, or on collaborative 
measures alone, to minimize how they will be affected by 
global risks. They need to prepare for them within their own 
organizations.
More and more firms have learned the hard way that when it 
comes to unlikely but impactful risks, such as natural 
disasters, intercontinental pandemics or financial crises, it is 
unwise to rely on the hope that they probably will not happen 
in the next few years. Tempting as it is for managers to take a 
NIMTOF (“not in my term of office”) approach to low-
likelihood risks, it can lead to severe adverse impacts if the 
risk occurs. 
This section examines the wide variety of ways in which firms 
approach risk in general. It goes on to suggest strategies for 
firms – and also governments – to build resilience to shocks 
from systemic global risks that, through interconnections 
and interdependencies, may impact them in unexpected 
ways. 
How Firms Approach Risk
Over the past decade, risk management has assumed a 
much more important role in many firms across different 
industry sectors. In general, there is a trend away from 
technical planning for individual risks and towards holistic 
planning for a range of unspecified risks. A spate of crises 
and extreme events in recent years has convinced many 
companies that the benefits of globalization have been 
accompanied by a much greater degree of interdependency 
and interconnectedness, bringing new vulnerabilities from 
unexpected directions. 
A related trend is for risk management to be approached 
from a more strategic and enterprise-wide perspective, 
typically with a chief risk officer (or some senior executive 
playing this role) reporting to the chief executive officer and 
the board, rather than decentralized to departments or 
reporting to the chief financial officer. Having the chief risk 
officer report to the top makes possible a more holistic 
approach to risk, where previously individual departments 
might have argued only for addressing risks that specifically 
affected them. This dynamic applies to governments, too, 
where there is also a tendency for departments to argue for 
attention to their own sector-specific risks rather than take a 
more holistic overview of the risks of the greatest national 
importance that may interact with and reinforce others if not 
mitigated. 
The risk analysis and management process is broadly the 
same across most firms, as depicted in Figure 2.5, but – as 
explored in the following sections – there is a wide spectrum 
of ways in which each step of the process is carried out. 
Figure 2.5: The Risk Analysis and Management Process 
Source: Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Useem 2013. 
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8. Monitor Progress and
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Identifying and Assessing Risks
Firms’ perceptions and assessments of risks can be skewed 
by decision-making biases, such as the “availability” bias. 
This involves overestimating the likelihood of a recently 
experienced disaster and underestimating the likelihood of 
those that occurred in earlier years. For example, a firm in 
Thailand whose building was burned down during political 
unrest decided to build its new office nearer the airport, 
which proved to be a high-risk location when floods afflicted 
the country in 2011.
Another decision-making bias that can skew risk perception 
is the tendency to put risks perceived as being below a 
possible threshold of likelihood in the category of “it will not 
happen to us”. For example, after the Japanese earthquake, 
all seven production lines of one large IT firm shut down; its 
risk planning had previously focused on a worst-case 
scenario of only one or two lines going down. Finally, another 
perception distortion is not realizing the hidden benefits of 
pre-emptive measures such as redundancy. 
These are examples of “intuitive”, in contrast to “deliberative”, 
thinking about risk. Many firms now attempt to avoid the 
pitfalls of intuitive thinking by employing more formal 
deliberative techniques, such as scenario analysis, stress 
tests and ranking/scoring metrics. Still, in some leading 
firms, risk assessment does not go beyond qualitative 
analysis through meetings and discussions. Figure 2.6 
shows the range of methods employed by firms for 
identifying and assessing risks, based on a series of 
interviews of 100 S&P 500 firms conducted recently.40 
In the finance and insurance sectors in particular, there is 
strong reliance on quantitative measures of risk probability. 
Some other firms, wary of being blindsided by erroneous 
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assumptions in the numbers that go into calculating the 
likelihood of adverse events, prefer to focus solely on the 
severity of risks and disregard any attempt to estimate their 
probability of happening. 
In most firms, risk assessment is now a highly formalized 
process conducted systematically and regularly, whether 
annually, quarterly, monthly or continuously. In some firms, 
risk assessment is part of the process through which the 
senior leadership defines the firm’s willingness to assume 
certain risks as a matter of high-level corporate strategy. 
Figure 2.7 shows the level at which risk identification, 
prioritization and assessment are performed in various firms.
Box 2.5 discusses risk management strategies of firms.
Figure 2.6: Identifying, Prioritizing and Assessing Risks
Source: Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Useem 2013.  
Figure 2.7: Who Is Involved in Identifying, Prioritizing and 
Assessing Risks
Source: Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Useem 2013.  
Figure A: How Risks Are Identified and Prioritized
Figure B: How Risks Are Assessed
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Figure A: Who Is Involved in Risk Identification and Prioritization
Figure B: Who Is Involved in Risk Assessment
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Firms are typically much more aware than they were even a 
few years ago of how interdependencies can lead to shocks 
affecting them in unexpected ways. For instance, historically 
a crisis befalling a competitor might have been regarded 
principally as an opportunity to gain market share; today, 
there is an awareness of the possibility of knock-on 
consequences, such as governments responding with hasty 
and ill-considered regulatory changes affecting the entire 
industry. Regulators are as prone as other decision-makers 
to the bias of placing too much emphasis on recent 
experiences.
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Box 2.5: Managing Risk
Risk-management strategies are guided by a firm’s risk appetite; the level of risk an organization is prepared to accept to 
achieve its objectives, such as profitability and safety goals. Often, although not always, there is a trade-off between 
profitability in times of normal operations and resilience in the face of negative events affecting the firm. Examples of risk 
management and monitoring strategies include:
– Mitigation measures: Actions taken by the firm to reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of a negative event; for 
example, designing plants to withstand specific levels of natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and hurricanes.
– Accountability measures: Finding ways to incentivize individual employees not to cut corners in ways that would 
normally be undetectable but would increase a firm’s vulnerability in a crisis, such as failing to maintain back-ups. Some 
firms hire external consultants to assess how effectively they are mitigating risks identified as priorities. 
– Supply-chain diversification: Sourcing supplies and raw materials from multiple providers in different locations to 
minimize disruption if one link in the supply chain is broken. Another hedge against sudden unavailability of inputs is to 
maintain an excess inventory of finished products.
– Avoiding less profitable risks: Firms may decide to drop activities altogether if they represent a small part of their 
overall business but a significant part of their risk profile.
– Transferring the risk: In addition to the range of insurance products available – liability, property, business interruption 
– some large firms run their own “captive” insurance companies to distribute risks across their own different operations 
and subsidiaries. 
– Retaining the risk: When insurance is unobtainable or not cost-effective, firms can choose to set aside reserves to 
cover possible losses from low-probability risks. 
– Early warning systems: Some firms employ their own teams to scan for specific risks that may be brewing, from 
political crises, for example, to storms off the coast of Africa that may become hurricanes in the US in the next fortnight. 
– Simulations and tabletop exercises: Many firms simulate crisis situations; for example, by making critical staff 
unexpectedly unavailable and assessing how other employees cope. Such exercises can capture lessons to be 
integrated into the risk-management strategy.
– Back-up sites: Many firms are set up so that if one or more factory or office becomes unusable, others are quickly able 
to assume the same functions. 
A crisis-management strategy complements a firm’s risk-management strategy by defining roles and decision-making 
procedures for preserving the continuity of business to reduce the economic, social and reputational impacts to the firm in 
the event of an emergency. Crisis-management plans identify who will be the most relevant decision-makers in a crisis. 
The key person is usually a manager in the affected location. In crises that are severe and span international boundaries, 
the chief executive officer and the board of directors are often involved. A growing number of firms have developed a 
general crisis plan to address unforeseen risks that complement specific plans for dealing with risks that have previously 
been experienced or scenarios that are considered especially plausible. 
The upside of this dynamic is that it creates awareness of the 
potential benefits of opening up channels of communication 
with competitors and the government so as to compare their 
risk- and crisis-management strategies. Box 2.6 explores the 
growing acceptance of the need for joint efforts involving 
companies, governments, civil society and research 
institutions to minimize the occurrence of global risks and 
their impact. 
Such dialogues enable mutual learning about risks on the 
horizon; they also create trust, which can be extremely 
helpful in navigating a crisis. Box 2.7 summarizes lessons 
learned from recent disasters in Asia on the need for 
“disaster governance” – coordinating diverse efforts among 
public, private and non-profit responses in a crisis. Chile’s 
rapid economic recovery after the devastating earthquake of 
2010 is another important example of success in 
government-led multistakeholder coordination.
Many firms have improved their risk management by 
systematically learning from their own catastrophic losses 
and near-misses as well as from other firms, even in different 
industries. For example, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010 prompted firms in various sectors to think more 
about operational risk. One leading firm in the energy 
industry studied the experience of investment banks after 
the financial crisis of 2008 to gain a new perspective on 
organizational blind spots. An auto-parts supplier revamped 
its approach to enterprise risk management after studying 
what happened to Enron and WorldCom.
45Global Risks 2014
P
art 1
P
art 2
P
art 3
Box 2.6: Public-Private Partnerships for Managing Catastrophic Risks
Contributed by the Global Agenda Council on Catastrophic Risks
No single entity possesses all the necessary authority, resources or expertise required to assure a community’s security 
and resilience to catastrophic risks. Government action alone cannot be relied on to prevent, protect against, respond 
to, recover from and mitigate the effects of adverse events. Governments need to be able to leverage the collective 
strengths and capabilities of the private sector and non-profit communities.
As people and things are increasingly hyperconnected and many critical infrastructure systems are intrinsically 
international in nature, the impacts of catastrophic events know no geographical, jurisdictional or industry boundaries. 
The interdependencies inherent in shared and global infrastructure can compound existing systemic risks, making 
consequences non-linear and hard to predict. 
In this environment, to strengthen overall resilience to catastrophic risk, the ability to create, effectively utilize and sustain 
multistakeholder partnerships is crucial. The public and private sectors must establish channels for structured dialogue, 
interaction and coordination to more comprehensively understand risks before they manifest and to more effectively 
manage them when they do. 
The public and private sectors bring different capabilities to the table. For example, the public sector can offer disaster 
management frameworks, including legal protections, personnel and training. The private sector can offer products and 
supplies, innovative business processes, community understanding and engagement, customer collaboration-driven 
engagement, and intimate knowledge of how critical infrastructure and communities work at a local level. Both sectors 
can offer research and development.
However, there is not always a perfect overlap between the interests of public and private sector stakeholders in 
catastrophic risk management. While they share many interests – such as the safety and security of people and property 
and continuity of business – the private sector is also interested in establishing competitive advantages. When seeking 
to create a public-private partnership, all potential partners should be able to identify a value proposition for partnering 
and demonstrate a return on investment. That means identifying what interests can be aligned and mutual benefits 
gained. 
Successful public-private partnerships also identify and agree to outcomes and objectives, establish roles and 
responsibilities, leverage environmental factors that support such partnerships, and mitigate any environmental barriers 
to the successful implementation of such partnerships. The World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on 
Catastrophic Risks works to codify and articulate such leading practices about how public-private partnerships 
can work. 
A cultural shift is under way, out of necessity, towards the creation of public-private partnerships to address catastrophic 
risks. Analysing the establishment and operations of these partnerships, as well as the effective use of the partners’ 
collective capabilities, is a vital step towards strengthening communal security and resilience. 
Open dialogue about risk is important not only outside a 
company but also within it, to ensure that the board of 
directors, C-suite and employees share a common 
understanding of the organizational approach. In fact, more 
boards are becoming proactive by asking management 
what the firm is doing to handle global risks as part of their 
overall strategy. Communication with others in the supply 
chain can be equally important, given that risk 
interdependencies can create cascading effects across 
borders and industry sectors. One of the most important 
steps a firm can take to improve its own risk management is 
to work with others in its supply chain to ensure that they are 
doing the same.
Towards a Culture of Long-term Thinking
The growing trend for boards to be involved in risk 
management is creating opportunities to shift organizational 
cultures away from a focus on quarterly results or daily 
share-price movements and towards the kind of longer-term 
thinking that is a prerequisite for addressing global risks. A 
similar shift is also urgently required in government, where 
the natural focus is on electoral timeframes − the NIMTOF 
philosophy. 
The role of chief risk officer, reporting to the chief executive 
officer and the board, is an institutional acknowledgement of 
the challenges in combining long- and short-term thinking – 
Global Risks 201446
P
art 1
P
art 2
P
art 3
Box 2.7: Learning from Responses to Large-scale Disasters
Since the devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, a multitude of large-scale disasters have hit the 
Asia-Pacific region. Valuable lessons have been learned about the factors that determine how people and institutions cope 
with disasters, and how to reduce the cascading or compounding effects of disasters.
In the aftermath of a catastrophic event, it is challenging to coordinate the massive influx of resources and organizations to 
meet pressing needs amid heavy damage to infrastructure. Emergency response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 
2013, for example, was delayed as most airplanes carrying crucial relief supplies were too big to land on smaller airstrips, 
causing bottlenecks at nearby international airports. 
And beyond the first crucial weeks of the relief phase, coordination has become even more complex as more actors get 
involved. Alongside national responders and international NGOs, external contributions now typically come from foreign 
religious-affiliated institutions, private corporations and business networks. As the focus switches from immediate 
humanitarian aid to longer-term recovery, this can create tensions with efforts to maintain national sovereignty.
The past decade has consequently seen a shift away from “disaster management” to what is referred to as “disaster 
governance”. There is growing attention to the need for “downward” accountability – ownership of relief and recovery 
efforts by the beneficiaries in the affected regions – to match the attention already given to “upward” accountability, which 
is about countering funders’ fears of waste and corruption. 
In recent years, for example, ASEAN has partnered with civil society organizations on capacity building for downward 
accountability. After the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, China paired institutions offering assistance with a specific region. 
After 700 bushfires raged across Australia’s Victoria state in February 2009, the response operations featured sharing of 
information across government agencies and with the public, along with community engagement and local decision-
making in the subsequent rebuilding efforts. 
In general, disasters are exacerbated by poverty, badly planned and badly managed urbanization, environmental 
degradation and weak institutions for managing risk at local and national levels. These effects were exemplified by the 
Thailand and Cambodia floods of 2011. Political support for disaster preparedness activities, from both the legislative and 
executive bodies, is central, but there is still a lack of funding and prioritization from international organizations and national 
governments, especially in lower-income countries. These countries may not have the liquidity or borrowing capacity to 
expeditiously recover from natural disasters, but evidence has shown that risk transfer to insurance markets can be 
particularly effective for these countries to avoid drastic disruptions to economic growth.
Going beyond the preparedness of institutions and formal mechanisms, containing damage from disaster also calls for an 
expansion of preparedness in society as a whole. For example, the Singapore government conducts regular large-scale 
exercises to stress-test crisis capabilities and rehearse the unfolding of interdependencies. An exercise in 2012 involved 
18,000 employees participating in terror-attack simulation. 
Scientific advances have been made in early-warning systems, digital technologies and in-time meteorological data, but 
these must be coupled with awareness campaigns and mainstreaming disaster preparedness in educational systems. 
Countless lives could have been saved as Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines had there been a greater level of popular 
understanding of the devastating effects of the typhoon “surge”. 
Source
For more information, see Brassard, C. and A. Raffin. 2011. “Resilience in Post Disaster Societies: From Crisis to Development.” Asian Journal of Social 
Science. 39(4): 417-424.
effectively outsourcing the full-time task of long-term 
thinking, short-term aggregation and troubleshooting to a 
designated individual and department. The equivalent in 
governments is the growing interest in the possible 
appointment of cabinet-level national risk officers, as was 
proposed and discussed at the 2012 G20 in the context of 
disaster risk-financing practices.41
While there will always be a temptation to prioritize short-
term concerns over long-term ones, both firms and 
governments can seek to nurture an institutional culture of 
valuing those in charge of thinking about risk, through 
remuneration, such as contingent bonuses, and other 
indications of prestige, such as high-level access. 
Incentive structures need to be closely analysed and, if 
necessary, overhauled to encourage long-term thinking. For 
instance, a culture that rewards decisions made quarterly or 
annually will likely trigger short-term thinking, while a 
knowledge management strategy is likely to contribute to 
longer-term thinking. To foster long-term thinking and 
commitment to the firm, a significant portion of bonuses in a 
number of companies is now based on the effectiveness of 
programmes and recommendations made 5-10 years back. 
Despite encouraging trends around the world, discussions 
with chief risk officers still reveal some frustration in their 
attempts to get board members to take seriously risks that 
are perceived as low-probability. Given that the cognitive 
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biases discussed above affect even senior executives and 
directors, reframing issues can be surprisingly important. 
Spreading upfront costs over time is another common 
technique: amortizing the cost of investments in resilience-
enhancing measures over a number of years can make the 
upfront cost seem less forbidding. This strategy can be 
combined with negotiating long-term insurance contracts 
that have lower premiums to reflect investment in protective 
measures as part of a risk-management strategy. If the 
premium savings exceed the annual costs of a long-term 
loan to finance the investment, the mitigation measures will 
be cost-effective and financially attractive to undertake. 
Offering long-term loans to cover investments in resilience is 
a strategy with wider applicability, being used, for instance, 
by the World Bank to aid developing countries take steps to 
reduce risks from adverse events. These could include 
enforcing building codes to reduce losses from earthquakes, 
floods and other natural disasters.
Many risk officers have also found that focusing on salient 
events – describing concrete experiences rather than relying 
on abstract statistics – is an effective tool to concentrate the 
attention of high-level decision-makers. This strategy, 
however, needs to be combined with efforts to ensure there 
is no undue fixation on specific recently experienced risks. 
Ultimately, leaders in both the public and private sectors 
need to be able to ask themselves concrete questions. The 
following checklist may provide guidance: 
1. What are the top five risks facing the organization and 
what does its risk appetite suggest with respect to 
managing them? 
2. What are the exposed assets, and how vulnerable are 
they? 
3. What options can address these risks relative to what is 
being done currently? 
4. What support is needed, and from whom? 
Despite recent progress, many leaders are still unable to 
answer these questions confidently. When all can, the world 
will be better equipped to meet global, systemic risks.
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constitute the largest group of consumers and make up 40% of the population 
in the US, Europe and the BRIC countries, and 10% in the rest of the world. 
9 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 2011. The term “Generation Z“ is avoided in 
this chapter as definitions vary for the exact age cohort included (often: born 
after 1995) and because it is following an alphabetical logic (Generation X, Y, Z) 
which applies to Anglo-Saxon Western countries only (the UK and the US to be 
precise) and is rooted in consumer surveys and political opinion research.
10 See ILO 2013a. 
11 According to OECD 2013, a quarter of workers aged 15-24 in OECD countries 
are on temporary contracts, increasing to over half in Spain and also, more 
surprisingly, in Germany and Switzerland. See “OECD project on Jobs for 
Youth”, available at www.oecd.org/employment/youth.
12 See http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p95-09-1.pdf.
13 See two recent Swiss Re studies, “Urbanisation in emerging markets: boon 
and bane for insurers” and “Mind the risk: A global ranking of cities under threat 
from natural disasters, 2013”, available at http://www.swissre.com/sigma/.
14 See http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/youth_
employment/.
15 ILO 2013a. 
16 McKinsey & Company 2013. 
17 For a recent account on the situation in Great Britain, see O’Connor 2013.
18 Gouglas 2013.
19 For example, South Korea’s systems of “Meister Schools” teach industry-
supported curricula, focusing on actually demanded skills. Case study available 
at http://mckinseyonsociety.com/e2e_casestudy/meister-high-schools-south-
korea/. 
20 The “Swiss Re 150 Years – Risk Perception Survey” is conducted by Gallup 
Europe. Results can be accessed at http://riskwindow.swissre.com/. The 
survey covers 19 countries in four regions (South and North America, Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa, Asia Pacific), using samples representative of the 
15+ year-old national population.
21 Networks at the same time have the disadvantage of creating reinforcing 
loops on certain topics and of being relatively homogeneous.
22 Coinage of the term digital native is being ascribed to American educator 
Marc Prensky, who thought about educational reforms in the digital age. See 
Prensky 2001.
23 “Swiss Re 150 Years – Risk Perception Survey”.
24 For an investigation on what shaped the mindset of “Generation Z”, see http://
rainmakerthinking.com/assets/uploads/2013/10/Gen-Z-Whitepaper.pdf. 
25 Swiss Re and IIF 2013.
26 For a profiled set of recommendations, which have been partly adopted here, 
see the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations 2013, available at 
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/commission.
27 A statistical table for country capacity to retain talent is given in The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 of the World Economic Forum 2013b, p. 
495.
28 Stoll 1988.
29 The term “electronic Pearl Harbor” dates to a 1991 testimony by author Winn 
Schwartau to the US Congress. For a longer discussion of this dynamic, see 
Healey and Grindal 2013.
30 Quote from Lt Col Roger Schell (USAF), “Computer Security: The Achilles 
Heel of the Electronic Air Force”, Air University Review, January-February 1979, 
available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/
jan-feb/schell.html. 
31 The Boston Consulting Group 2010. 
32 World Economic Forum 2012a. 
33 World Economic Forum 2012b. 
34 World Economic Forum 2012c and for more on hyperconnectivity, see http://
www.weforum.org/issues/hyperconnectivity.
35 CHEW was coined by former White House cybersecurity “czar” Richard A. 
Clarke.
36 NSTAC 2008.
37 UNIDIR 2011.
38 CISCO 2010. 
39 Some of this section is taken from Healey 2011.
40 Kunreuther et al. 2013.
41 Michel-Kerjan 2012.
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Part 3: Towards Ten Years of 
the Global Risks Report 
Since it was introduced in 2006, the Global Risks report has 
provided a unique analysis of the risks that are shaping the 
global environment, and the potentially cascading negative 
consequences of their interactions. The overall goal is to 
provide a platform for dialogue among business, 
government and civil society on how countries, businesses 
and people can prepare for, mitigate and build resilience in 
the face of risks. 
As the report nears its 10th edition in 2015, this section 
reflects on the insights gathered from past reports on how to 
map and address global risks. These reflections provide a 
basis to reassess and update the approach and 
methodology, to ensure that the report remains at the cutting 
edge of collective understanding of global risks. 
Defining and Identifying Global Risks
The number of global risks included in the Global Risks 
report series has changed over time. While 25 risks were 
included in 2006, 50 were identified in 2012 and 2013 and 
were then streamlined to 31 in this report. The systemic 
nature of global risks has been emphasized since the 
beginning, while the report’s 10-year time horizon has 
allowed for a focus on strategies and policies to anticipate 
and manage potential risks, rather than merely react to them. 
In the coming year, a number of expert workshops will be 
held to review the definition of global risk – currently seen as 
an occurrence that causes significant negative impact for 
several countries and industries – to identify and understand 
their nature, and to enhance comprehension of the 
interconnections between them.
One challenge is to distinguish between a risk and a trend or 
a vulnerability. Technically, a risk is something that has not 
happened yet, whereas a trend or a vulnerability is already 
under way. Some global risks in this year’s report, such as 
severe income disparity, may be more accurately viewed as 
a trend or a vulnerability. In many cases, the distinction is far 
from clear – for example, opinions may differ on whether 
major loss of biodiversity is an event that could yet happen 
or a process that is already happening. 
Another challenge is to determine a common level of 
granularity among global risks: Is a political collapse of a 
nation of geopolitical importance at the same conceptual 
level as overall global governance failure? Can the failure to 
mitigate climate change that threatens to make the earth 
increasingly uninhabitable be placed at the same level of 
gravity as a one-off, large-scale cyber attack? 
Mapping Global Risks
Throughout the Global Risks report series, risks have been 
analysed on two dimensions: likelihood and impact. Both 
can be important when aiming to prioritize which risks to 
attempt to prevent (i.e. reducing the likelihood of the event) 
and/or mitigate (i.e. reducing the severity of the impact).
Experience has shown, however, that neither can be 
measured definitively. Initially, the report attempted to 
measure impact by assigning (when possible) actuarial 
values such as an estimated number of deaths or the 
economic impact in US dollars, based on expert input. This 
arguably had the advantage of being as objective a measure 
as possible, but had the disadvantage of relying heavily on 
assumptions and being unable to account for a range of 
outcomes – there are, for example, widely varying estimates 
of the financial impact of climate change depending on the 
level of temperature rise. Also, this approach cannot be 
extended to all risks: it is impossible to estimate the likely 
financial and human cost of, for example, biodiversity loss or 
geopolitical conflict.
Since 2009, the report has used expert surveys that ask 
respondents to estimate impact and likelihood. This has the 
advantage of being more applicable to risks of different 
natures, allowing for greater ease of comparison. On the 
downside, perception data can be skewed by cognitive 
biases of the kind discussed in Part 2.5 of this report, which 
predispose people to be more concerned with current 
headlines and recently-experienced risks. Nonetheless, this 
approach can highlight areas that are of most concern to 
different stakeholders, and potentially galvanize shared 
efforts to address them.
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Towards a Multistakeholder Approach 
The responsibility of preparing for, mitigating and building 
resilience against many of the risks discussed in this report 
remains fragmented and unclear. People in the best position 
to influence solutions to a risk may not be the ones who have 
most to lose from it. Questions surrounding who can and 
should take ownership of planning for the risk, and what is 
an acceptable level of risk, remain difficult to answer.
With these concerns in mind, the Global Risks report series 
has increasingly emphasized the importance of 
interconnectivity and the systemic nature of global risks, with 
the possibility of multiple simultaneous or sequential shocks. 
By their nature, global risks cross borders. No country, 
industry or organization can deal with them in isolation. They 
require collective thinking and responses, taking a long-term 
perspective. The report has increasingly moved towards 
providing a basis for discussion among stakeholders on how 
to mitigate risks, prepare for them and strengthen resilience 
in a collaborative fashion.
Looking Ahead to the 10th Anniversary
The adjustments to the survey and analysis in this year’s 
report are part of the ongoing efforts to provide a solid base 
for the World Economic Forum’s work on global risks in the 
future, and mirror the evolving nature of global risks. Drawing 
on the Forum’s multistakeholder community of business, 
academia, government and civil society, the methodology 
and analysis will be reviewed and improved during the 
course of 2014, in preparation for the report’s 10th 
anniversary in January 2015. 
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This report has explored how a wide range of global risks – 
from the possibility of fiscal crisis in an important economy to 
the fallouts from new technologies, social tensions and 
changing geopolitical relations – could have long-lasting and 
far-reaching systemic impacts. 
In exploring the global risks landscape for 2014, this report 
has highlighted the importance of several underlying themes 
in tackling global risks:
– Trust is necessary if stakeholders are to work together to 
tackle global risks, but trust is being undermined in some 
systemically important areas. For example, much of the 
younger generation lacks trust in traditional political 
institutions and leaders, while recent revelations about 
cyber espionage have undermined trust in the Internet in 
general and the governance of cyberspace in particular. 
– Long-term thinking is a prerequisite for any approach to 
global risks. This report has explored strategies through 
which corporations and governments can attempt to 
incentivize a shift from short-term to long-term time 
horizons. 
– Collaborative multistakeholder action is required as 
businesses, governments, or civil society alone do not 
have both the tools and the authority to tackle systemic 
risks. We hope that the mapping of global risks and their 
interconnections will provide a common base to better 
understand risks and their consequences, and for 
dialogue as a first step towards collective action.  
– Global governance is key to addressing global risks 
such as climate change or cybersecurity, but new 
models are urgently needed as the world’s increasing 
multipolarity renders its current global governance 
structures unwieldy and outdated. 
Conclusion
This report has aimed to increase awareness of and inspire 
action on the most important risks the world faces over the 
next 10 years, in the hope of addressing the most pressing 
of these challenges. The World Economic Forum will 
continue to provide a platform for leaders to work together 
on preparing for risks, mitigating them and strengthening 
resilience.
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Global Risk Description
Fiscal crises in key economies Excessive debt burdens generate rising interest rates, inflationary 
pressures and sovereign debt crises
Failure of a major financial mechanism or institution A financial institution or currency regime of systemic importance 
collapses, with implications throughout the global financial system
Liquidity crises Shortages of financial resources from banks and capital markets 
become extreme and recurring, while the ability to sell assets is 
reduced
Structurally high unemployment/underemployment A sustained high level of unemployment that is structural rather 
than cyclical in nature coincides with a rising skills gap and high 
underemployment, especially among youth populations
Oil-price shock to the global economy Sharp and/or sustained oil price increases place further economic 
pressures on highly oil-dependent industries and consumers, while 
raising geopolitical tensions
Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure Chronic failure to adequately invest in, upgrade and secure 
infrastructure networks leads to a major breakdown, with system-
wide implications
Decline of importance of the US dollar as a major 
currency 
A shift away from the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency 
impacts the global economic and financial system, and changes 
the geopolitical balance
Greater incidence of extreme weather events (e.g. 
floods, storms, fires)
Property, infrastructure and environmental damage linked to 
development in hazard-prone areas increases, as does the 
frequency of extreme weather events
Greater incidence of natural catastrophes (e.g. 
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
geomagnetic storms)
Existing precautions and preparedness measures fail in the face 
of geophysical disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, 
landslides, tsunamis or geomagnetic storms, causing widespread 
disruptions in interconnected supply chains and communication 
networks
Greater incidence of man-made environmental 
catastrophes (e.g. oil spills, nuclear accidents)
Existing precautions and preparedness measures fail to prevent 
man-made catastrophes, causing greater harm to lives, human 
health, infrastructure, property, economic activity and the 
environment
Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse (land 
and ocean)
Degradation of biodiversity results in severely depleted resources 
for industries such as fishing and forestry, with potentially 
irreversible consequences for the environment
Water crises A significant decline in the quality and quantity of fresh water 
combines with increased competition among resource-intensive 
systems, such as food and energy production
Failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation Governments and businesses fail to enforce or enact effective 
measures to protect populations and to help businesses impacted 
by climate change to transition
Global governance failure Weak or inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks, 
combined with competing national and political interests, impede 
attempts to cooperate on addressing global risks 
Political collapse of a nation of geopolitical 
importance
One or more systemically critical countries experience significant 
erosion of trust and mutual obligations between states and 
citizens, leading to state collapse, internal violence, regional or 
global instability and, potentially, military conflict
Increasing corruption The widespread and deep-rooted abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain (by businesses and public officials) undermines the rule 
of law and governance
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Global Risk Description
Major escalation in organized crime and illicit trade Highly organized and very agile global networks commit criminal 
offences while the illegal trafficking of goods and people spreads 
unchecked throughout the global economy
Large-scale terrorist attacks Individuals or non-state groups successfully inflict large-scale 
human or material damage, which is particularly problematic when 
decentralized and widespread
Deployment of weapons of mass destruction The availability of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological 
technologies and materials leads to major international crises
Violent inter-state conflict with regional 
consequences
International disputes escalate into armed conflicts
Escalation of economic and resource nationalization States move unilaterally to ban imports or exports of key 
commodities, stockpile reserves and expropriate natural resources
Food crises Access to appropriate quantities and quality of food and nutrition 
becomes inadequate or unreliable
Pandemic outbreak Inadequate disease surveillance systems, failed international 
coordination and the lack of vaccine production capacity lead to 
the uncontrolled spread of infectious disease
Unmanageable burden of chronic disease Increasing burden of illness and long-term costs of treatment 
threaten recent societal gains in life expectancy and quality while 
overburdening strained economies
Severe income disparity Widening gaps between the richest and poorest citizens threaten 
social and political stability as well as economic development
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria Growing resistance of deadly bacteria to known antibiotics inhibits 
the ability to control deadly diseases
Mismanaged urbanization (e.g. planning failures, 
inadequate infrastructure and supply chains)
Poorly planned cities, urban sprawl and associated infrastructure 
amplify drivers of environmental degradation and cope ineffectively 
with migration, demographic and health challenges
Profound political and social instability Military actions or aggressive foreign or trade policies on the part 
of global or regional powers disrupt political or social stability, 
negatively impacting populations, investment and financial markets
Breakdown of critical information infrastructure and 
networks 
Systemic failures of critical information infrastructure (CII) and 
networks negatively impact industrial production, public services 
and communications
Escalation in large-scale cyber attacks State-sponsored, state-affiliated, criminal or terrorist cyber attacks 
increase
Massive incident of data fraud/theft Criminal or wrongful exploitation of private data takes place on an 
unprecedented scale
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Appendix B - Global Risks Perception Survey and Methodology 2014
As discussed in Part 1, the Global Risk 2014 report has 
adjusted the list of global risks to take into account learnings 
from past editions as well as developments in the global risks 
landscape. As a result, the set of global risks was 
streamlined with a view to improving the fit of the individual 
risks with the definition introduced in this year’s report. The 
Global Risks Perceptions Survey has been adjusted 
accordingly. The following section describes the survey and 
methodology in greater detail. 
Figure A.1: Survey Sample Composition (per cent)
Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2013-2014.
The Global Risks Perceptions Survey
The Global Risks Perception Survey, discussed in Part 1, is 
the main instrument for assessing global risks in this report. 
The survey was conducted between October and November 
2013 among the World Economic Forum’s multistakeholder 
communities of leaders from business, government, 
academia and non-governmental and international 
organizations. The graph below shows the profile of the 
survey respondents. To capture the voice of youth, the 
survey also targeted the World Economic Forum’s 
community of Global Shapers.  Under-30s accounted for 
approximately one-quarter of the respondents. 
 
Gender
27.7
72.3
Male
Female
Age
21.8
78.2
30 and over
Below 30
Stakeholder group
40.6
Business
Academia
Geography
39.7 52.1
Advanced economies
Emerging and 
developing world
18.3
17.0
8.5
8.2
7.4
Non-governmental 
organizations
International 
organizations
Others
Government
8.2
Not specified
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Risks of Highest Concern in 2014
To identify the top 10 global risks of highest concern, 
described in Part 1, respondents answered the following 
question: “From the following list of 31 risks, please select 
the five risks of highest concern globally and rank these from 
1 (of highest concern) to 5 (of lowest concern)”. A score was 
assigned for each answer based on the rank, from 5 points 
for the first-ranked risk to 1 point for the fifth-ranked. For 
example, if the risk of water crises was cited as the risk of 
biggest concern (Rank 1), the answer would be assigned five 
points; if it was cited as the fifth risk of most concern, the 
answer would be assigned one point. The score earned by 
each risk corresponds to the total points earned by that risk 
across all responses divided by the number of responses. 
The risks with the 10 highest scores were selected as the 
risks of highest concern. 
Formally, for any given risk i from the list of 31 risks, the score 
is derived as follows: 
where N is the number of respondents to the survey and 
ranki,n corresponds to the rank assigned by respondent n to 
risk i. 
Global Risks Landscape in 2014
Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood and global 
impact of each of the 31 risks. For each risk, they were 
asked, “How likely is this risk to materialize globally within the 
next 10 years?” and “What is the estimated impact globally if 
this risk were to materialize? (Impact is to be interpreted in a 
broad sense beyond just economic consequences)”. The 
possible answers ranged from 1 (“very unlikely” and “low 
impact”, respectively) to 7 (“almost certain” and “high 
impact”, respectively). Respondents were given the 
possibility to leave the answer blank if they felt unable to 
provide an informed answer (“don’t know”). A simple average 
for both likelihood and impact for each of the 31 global risks 
was calculated on this basis. Formally, for any given risk i, its 
likelihood and impact, denoted respectively likelihoodi and 
impacti, are:
where Ni is the number of respondents for risk i, and 
likelihoodi,n and impacti,n are respectively the likelihood and 
impact assigned by respondent n to risk i and measured on 
a scale from 1 to 7. Moreover, Ni
1≠ Ni
2 as, for each risk i, 
survey respondents could choose not to answer each 
question (“don’t know”). 
Interconnections in 2014
To draw the interconnection map presented in Part 1, survey 
respondents were asked to identify three to six pairs of risks 
they believed were connected, disregarding directions of 
causality. A tally was made of the number of times each pair 
was cited. This value was then divided by the count of the 
most frequently cited pair. As a final step, the square root of 
this ratio was taken to dampen the long-tail effect (i.e. a few 
very strong links, and many weak ones) and to make the 
differences more apparent across the weakest connections. 
The value of the interconnection determines the thickness of 
each connecting line in the graph, with the most frequently 
cited pair having the thickest line. Out of the 465 possible 
pairs, 178 or 38% were not cited. Formally, the intensity of 
the connection between risks i and j, denoted 
interconnectionij, corresponds to:
scorei=
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 where N is the number of respondents. Variable pairij,n is 1 
when respondent n selected the pair of risks i and j as part of 
his/her selection. Otherwise, it is 0.
Risks and Trends to Watch in 2014
Survey respondents were asked two open questions: 
“Which risk of major global concern is missing from the list of 
the 31 risks (list one risk only)” and “Which additional issue 
could potentially emerge as a risk of major global concern in 
the future (list one issue only)?” Given the large range of 
answers provided by the respondents, answers were 
manually grouped into broader categories. Figure 1.5 in Part 
1 is an illustration of the recurrence of these categories: the 
larger the category the more often it was mentioned. The 
purpose of these two questions was to stimulate debate on 
the identification of future risks and trends. 
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